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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the central objectives in counterterrorism policy is commonly said
to be to balance the competing demands of security and liberty. This task is
often metaphorized using the image of a set of scales, with the pan on one side
containing security and the pan on the other side containing liberty. This
approach asserts that a change in circumstances may result in an imbalance
between these values (or reveal a pre-existing imbalance of which we were
ignorant), and so necessitate some redressive action. So, following the attacks
of 9/11, the magnitude of which far exceeded all previous terrorist attacks in or
on the United States, it was deemed necessary to strike a new balance, reducing
the protection of liberty for the sake of increased security.
The utility of the balance metaphor has been questioned by several commentators. Broadly speaking, these critiques have focussed on five different
concerns. First, it has been argued that the metaphor's dichotomization of
security and liberty obscures the complex relationship between these two
values. To some extent, at least, the values are mutually interdependent.'
Security is needed if we are to be free to enjoy our liberties,2 whilst seeking to
enhance our security against the terrorist threat by eroding civil liberties
safeguards could result in diminished security against the power of the state.3
Some have even warned that presenting security and liberty as binary opposites
could undermine the concept of human rights.4 Second, the balance metaphor
has been criticized for obscuring the distribution of proposed changes in
security and liberty. The fact is that new counterterrorism policies will affect
only a small minority of American citizens, and so "we need to pay attention to
the few/most dimension of the balance, not just the liberty/security
dimension."5 Given that experience teaches us that most of those affected will
1. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of the Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARv. L. REv. 19, 155 (2002) ("Only a strong, safe, and stable democracy may afford and
protect human rights, and only a democracy built on the foundations of human rights can have security.").
2.
Tamar Meisels, How Terrorism Upsets Liberty, 53 POL. STUD. 162, 164 (2005). See also Viet
D. Dinh, FreedomandSecurity after September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 399,406 (2002) ("America's
tradition of freedom thus is not an obstacle to be overcome in our campaign to rid the world of individuals
capable of the evil we saw on September 11. It is, rather, an integral objective of our campaign to defend and
preserve the security of our nation and the safety of our citizens.").
3.
Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 191, 205
(2003).
4.
Gerd Oberleitner, Porcupines in Love: The Intricate Convergence of Human Rights and
Human Security, 6 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 588, 605 (2005). See CONOR GEARTY, CAN HUMAN RIGHTS
SURVIVE? 102-08 (2006); Conor Gearty, Terrorism and Human Rights, 42 GOV'T & OPPOSmON 340, 342
(2007).
5.

Waldron, supra note 3, at 203. See also Ronald Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism,49 (No.
3) N.Y. REv. BKS. 48 (2002); Ronald Dworkin, Terror & the Attack on Civil Liberties, 50 (No. 17) N.Y.

REV. BKs. 38 (2003).

2008]

Macdonald

be Arabs and followers of Islam6 and that there is a tendency to think of
individual suspects as presumptive offenders,7 it is important to espouse a
communal, as opposed to an individual, interest in the protection of civil
liberties.'
Third, it has been suggested that the balance metaphor is
consequentialist-it assumes that an increase in the risk to security justifies a
commensurate diminution in liberty-and so may not be appropriate in the
realm of civil liberties. Whilst it is possible to argue that potential victims have
rights too, so that rights are also at stake on the security side of the balance,9
this merely raises complex and philosophically controversial questions about
conflicting rights which the balance metaphor is ill-equipped to address.1 °
Fourth, the balance metaphor has been criticised for assuming a kind of
hydraulic relationship between security and liberty-as the protection of one
is increased, so the protection of the other is necessarily eroded, and vice versa.
Of particular concern here is the fact that, by equating the erosion of liberties
with enhanced security, the metaphor obscures the need to show that a new
power will actually increase security and so can produce a readiness to diminish
liberties even when it is uncertain whether this will result in security gains.''
Fifth, the very concept of balancing has been questioned. It has been suggested
that the re-emergence of romantic sensibilities, in particular national honour,
means that we cannot think rationally in the manner envisaged by the balancing
discourse. 2 Ronald Dworkin, meanwhile, has argued that the task is not to
decide where our interest lies on balance, but to determine what justice
requires. 3 If we believe that it is necessary to treat suspected terrorists
unfairly-in the sense that they should be denied those rights which we deem
to be the minimum that we owe to anyone who is accused of a serious
crime-then we should have the candour to admit that they are being treated
unfairly, insist that government show that unfair treatment is necessary, and
mitigate the unfairness as far as possible.
The focus of this essay is on a different aspect of the balance metaphorthe primacy it attaches to deciding the respective weights of security and
liberty. In his exposition of the metaphor Posner writes:
6.
Philip A. Thomas, 9/11: USA and UK, 26FORDHAMINT'LL.J. 1193, 1208(2003).
7.
See Dinh, supra note 2, at 400-01.
8.
Lucia Zedner, Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reflectionsfrom CriminalJustice,32
J.L. SOC'Y 507, 514 (2005) (citing DAVID DIXON, LAW ON POLICING: LEGAL REGULATION AND PRACTICES
283 (1997)).
9.
See generallyAnastassia Tsoukala, Democracy in the Light of Security: British and French
PoliticalDiscourses on Domestic Counter-TerrorismPolicies, 54 POL. STUD. 607 (2006).
10.
Waldron, supra note 3, at 199.
11.
ld at 208; Zedner, supra note 8, at 514.
12.
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT WAR: GLORY AND GUILT INTHE AGE OF TERRORISM 14
(2002).
13.
Dworkin, supra note 5, at 48.
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[T]he proper way to think about constitutional rights in a time such as
this is in terms of the metaphor of a balance. One pan contains
individual rights, the other community safety, with the balance
needing and receiving readjustment from time to time as the weights
of the respective interests change... .
The difficulty with this is that it assumes a shared understanding of what
each pan of the metaphorical scales represents. Yet, this is far from selfevident; people hold widely divergent views on what the demands of both
security and liberty actually are and on how these demands would best be met.
To suggest that all debates on contemporary counterterrorism policy stem from
different views on the respective weights of security and liberty obscures this
and hinders engagement with the variety of perspectives held by different
people. For example, a person who opposes a measure which others claim is
essential to safeguard our security may do so because s/he does not believe that
the dictates of security require its implementation, not because s/he attaches
less weight to security. Someone who supports the implementation of a
security-enhancing measure in spite of protests that it will diminish liberty may
do so not because s/he attaches less weight to liberty (and/or more weight to
security) than the measure's opponents, but because s/he does not believe that
the measure involves any sacrifice of liberty. Using a number of practical
examples, it will be argued that for many disputed issues in contemporary
counterterrorism policy, the root cause of the contention is not different views
on the relative weights of security and liberty, but different views on what these
concepts require. Since the balance metaphor is insensitive to this, this essay
seeks to construct a framework which opens up consideration of the variety of
different perspectives held by those involved in debates on counterterrorism
policy.
The essay begins by focusing on security. This section of the essay starts
by affirming the importance of distinguishing between the objective and
subjective senses of security by showing the damaging effect a failure to make
this distinction has on discussions of counterterrorism policy. It then draws on
works from the fields of psychology and sociology to argue that it would be
inappropriate to seek to increase subjective security by enacting
counterterrorism legislation, and so the aim of counterterrorism legislation
should be to increase objective security. This section of the essay finishes by
outlining a four-step approach to deciding whether objective security requires
the enactment of a particular counterterrorism measure.

14.

RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL

EMERGENCY 148 (2006) (emphasis added).

2008]

Macdonald

Turning to liberty, the next section of the essay argues that there is a
fundamental disparity between the discourse surrounding the balance metaphor

and statements from those who debate counterterrorism measures which
describe what they perceive themselves to be doing. Using the debates over the
so-called library provision of the USA PATRIOT Act and the use of torture in
emergency situations of grave danger as examples, the essay shows how
different people can hold different views on three issues relating to
liberty-whether a particular power should ever be vested in the state; what
effect a power will actually have on liberty; and whether safeguards are needed
to regulate how a power is used-and highlights the balance metaphor's failure
to open up consideration of these different perspectives. The essay concludes
by advancing an alternative framework for the analysis and evaluation of
counterterrorism policy.
11. SECURITY

Security is an open-textured concept. 5 It can be used to describe both a
state of being and a means to that end. 6 Since in the context of counterterrorism policy it is primarily used in the first of these two senses, it will be
taken here as referring to a state of being. 7 Even then, though, security can still
be taken as describing quite distinct objective and subjective conditions."i
Using recent books by Richard Posner and Bruce Ackerman, this section of the
essay begins by showing the damaging effect a failure to make this distinction
can have on discussion of counterterrorism policy. Having underscored the
importance of the distinction, the essay first focuses on subjective security.
Drawing on work from the fields of psychology and sociology, it argues that
new counterterrorism laws should not be enacted on the basis that they will
make the public feel safer. The final part of this section considers security in
the objective sense. It outlines a four-step approach to the discussion of
whether objective security supports the enactment of a proposed counterterrorism measure.
A. The Objective and Subjective Senses of Security

It is important to distinguish between objective and subjective security.
This is because the two do not always go hand-in-hand; often there can be a
discrepancy between how safe people feel and how safe they actually are.' 9 For
15.
See Lucia Zedner, The Concept ofSecurity: An Agendafor ComparativeAnalysis, 23 LEGAL
STUD. 153, 154 (2003).
16.
Id. at 155.
17.
See id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id. at 156.
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example, in the final quarter of 2001, following the attacks of 9/11, there was
a marked decrease (of eighteen percent) in the number of airline passengers
compared with the same time period in 2000.20 One study concluded that a
substantial portion of the flights that were not taken were replaced with (mainly
leisure) road trips. 2' The principal reason for this trend was apparently that
people felt unsafe flying.22 The feeling of safety individuals gained by
changing their travel plans was, however, quite out of sync with the facts.23
Even allowing for 9/11, flying is safer than driving.2 4 For any distance that is
long enough for flying to be an option, driving on even the safest roads is
riskier than flying with the major airlines; for flying to become equally risky,
incidents on the scale of 9/11 would have to occur roughly once a month.25
Moreover, the study found that the number of traffic fatalities during the final
quarter of 2001 rose by 1018 (8.8%) over the expected frequency.26 So, whilst
many individuals gained greater feelings of security by changing their travel
plans, they were in fact opting for a riskier activity and increasing the riskiness
of that activity in the process.
The fact that there can be a disparity between objective and subjective
security means that it is essential to distinguish the two when discussing
counterterrorism policy. Unfortunately, however, the balance metaphor simply
invites us to consider what weight should be attached to security. It is unclear
whether this is because the metaphor simply assumes that security refers to
either an objective or a subjective condition-in which case, this assumption
should be made plain and justified-or because it assumes that the two senses
of security invariably pull together. Either way, the failure to distinguish
between objective and subjective security diminishes the metaphor's value as
an analytical tool, for a failure to make this distinction obscures discussions of
counterterrorism policy. This can be illustrated using two recent examplesRichard Posner's Not a Suicide Pact and Bruce Ackerman's Before the Next
Attack.

20. Michael J. Flannagan & Michael Sivak, Flying and DrivingAfter the September 11 Attacks,
91 (No. 1) AM. SCI. 6 (2003).
21.
Michael J. Flannagan & Michael Sivak, Consequences for Road Traffic Fatalitiesof the
Reduction in Flying Following September 11, 2001, AM. SCI. 301, 302 (2004) (citing Gerd Gigerenzer,
Dream Risk, September 11, and Fatal Traffic Accidents, 15 PsYCHOL. Sci. 286, 286 (2004)).
22.
Id. at 301.
23.
Id. at 302 (citing Gingerenzer, supra note 21, at 287).
24.
See id.
25.
Flannagan & Sivak, supra note 20, at 8.
26.
Flannagan & Sivak, supra note 21, at 303.
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1. Richard Posner's Not a Suicide Pac27
In Not a SuicidePact,Posner states that following the attacks of 9/1 1, the
nation felt less safe than before. 28 Employing the metaphor of a balance, he
then contends that this increased sense of vulnerability justified some
curtailment of individual rights:
The safer the nation feels, the greater the weight that the courts place
on personal liberty relative to public safety. When the nation feels
endangered, the balance shifts the other way. The nation felt much
safer before the 9/11 attacks than after, just as it felt much safer after
the Cold War ended than before, and after the Civil War than while
it was raging.29
What is striking about this assertion is that the relative weights of public
safety and personal liberty are determined by how safe/endangered the nation
feels. This is problematic, first, because it assumes that a nation's increased
sense of endangerment automatically translates into a willingness to curtail civil
liberties. Yet, many responded to the attacks by insisting that, although the
attacks caused them to feel less safe than before, civil liberties should not be
sacrificed since to do so would hand the terrorists the victory. The assertion is
also at odds with Posner's rejection of the suggestion that the curtailments of
individual rights imposed in the aftermath of the attacks may no longer be
justified.30 In terms reminiscent ofFrank Knight's distinction between unknowable uncertainty and calculable risk,3 Posner contends that, notwithstanding the
public's decreasing sense of vulnerability, such curtailments are still justified
since terrorist leaders may be planning an attack on a scale to dwarf 9/11:
With the 9/11 attacks receding in time, forgetfulness and complacency are becoming the order of the day. Are we safer or do we
just feel safer? Though scattered by our invasion of Afghanistan and
by our stepped-up efforts at counterterrorism, terrorist leaders may
even now be regrouping, and preparing an attack that will produce
destruction on a scale to dwarf 9/1 1.32

27.
POSNER, supra note 14. See generally David Cole, The Poverty of Posner's Pragmatism:
BalancingAway Liberty After 9/11, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1735 (2007).
28.
POSNER, supra note 14, at 40.
29.
Id. A similar passage is also found later in the book: "The safer we feel, the more weight we
place on the interest in personal liberty; the more endangered we feel, the more weight we place on the interest
in safety, while recognizing the interdependence of the two interests." Id. at 148.
30.
Id. at 148.
31.

FRANK KNIGHT, RISK UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19 (Beard Books 2002) (1921).

32.

POSNER, supra note 14, at 148.
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The approach in this passage-neatly captured by Posner's earlier
assertion that "[flor all we know, we may be quite safe. But we cannot afford
to act on that optimistic assumption" 33-is based on some assessment of the
actual threat posed to the nation by terrorism. The inconsistency of this-to
appeal to how a nation feels following a terrorist atrocity, but then dismiss how
the nation feels several years later as forgetful and complacent-is obvious. It
also disregards the fact that, whilst the passing of time might conceivably cause
a nation to slide towards forgetfulness and complacency, the nation's
perception of the terrorist threat is equally (if not more) likely to be distorted
in the aftermath of a large-scale attack. This inconsistency is also evident in the
following key passage, Posner's statement of the central argument of his book:
The general argument of these chapters is that the scope of constitutional liberties is rightly less extensive at a time of serious terrorist
threats and rapid proliferation of means of widespread destruction
than at a time of felt safety, but that the degree of curtailment required
to protect us is not so great as to impair the feeling of freedom that is
so important to Americans.34
The fundamental problem with this passage is that it fails to distinguish
between the objective and subjective senses of security. Posner contrasts "a
time of serious terrorist threats and rapid proliferation of means of widespread
destruction" (lack of security in the objective sense) with "a time of felt safety"
(security in the subjective sense) as if the two are mutually exclusive,
contending that "the scope of constitutional liberties is rightly less extensive"
in the former situation than in the latter.35 But flitting between the objective
and subjective senses of security in this way ignores the possibility that there
may be a disparity between how secure people are and how secure they feel.
This error is especially stark given that Posner himself argues that, although
terrorist leaders may even now be planning large-scale attacks, forgetfulness
and complacency are contributing to a growing sense of safety. Ifthis argument
is correct, then the contemporaneous situation is both "a time of serious
terrorist threats" and "a time of felt safety., 36 Posner's statement of the central
argument of his book, thus, implodes.

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.at 6.
Id.at 10-11.
Id. at 11.
Id.
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2. Bruce Ackerman's Before the Next Attack3 7

A failure to distinguish between the objective and subjective senses of
security has an equally damaging effect on Bruce Ackerman's Before the Next
Attack, in which he argues for the creation of an emergency constitution which
could be triggered following a terrorist attack on (at least) the scale of 9/1 L3
To understand the merger of the objective and subjective senses of security in
Ackerman's proposal, it is necessary to trace its evolution.
Prior to the publication of Before the Next Attack, Ackerman outlined his
thinking in an exploratory essay.3 9 His declared purpose was to "design a
constitutional framework for a temporary state of emergency that enables
government to discharge the reassurance function without doing long-term
damage to individual rights."4 Having argued that it would be inappropriate
to discharge this "reassurance function" using the concept of a war,41 Ackerman
asserted that it cannot be achieved using the criminal law either. Following a
terrorist attack the state's effective sovereignty is in doubt and so "government
must act visibly and decisively to demonstrate to its terrorized citizens that the
breach was only temporary and that it is taking aggressive action to contain the
crisis and to deal with the prospect of its recurrence."4' 2 The criminal law is illsuited for this task because it "presupposes broad-ranging confidence in the
government's general capacity to discharge its sovereign functions." 3
Ackerman's emphasis on reassuring the public-on promoting security in
the subjective sense-led to his proposal being criticized. One of the principal
features of his suggested emergency constitution is preventive detention. 44 The
notion that preventive detention might be warranted to reassure a panicked
public was strongly criticized by David Cole:
In light of the disastrous precedents of the Palmer and Ashcroft raids
and the Japanese internment, it is striking that all Ackerman can say
37.

See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES

IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006).
38.
Id.at 4.
39.
See generally Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004).
40.
Id.at 1037.
41.
War, he asserted, is a "state of belligerency between sovereigns." Moreover, the opacity of the
concept of a war on terrorism "predictably leads to sweeping incursions on fundamental liberties." Id.at
1032.
42.
Id.at 1037.
43.
Id.
44.
In his original exploratory essay Ackerman stated that the government would be authorized to
"detain suspects without the criminal law's usual protections of probable cause or even reasonable suspicion
...for a period of forty-five to sixty days." Ackerman, supra note 39, at 1037, 1077; In Before the Next
Attack he recoiled somewhat, saying that "[n]obody will be detained for more than forty-five days, and then
only on reasonable suspicion." ACKERMAN, supra 37, at 4.
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in favor of his preventive detention scheme is that it might 'reassure'
a panicked public. Nowhere does he claim that preventive detention
will in fact make us safer.45
In response, Ackerman suggested that Cole's criticism "may be a product
of misunderstanding." 6 Drawing attention to his own statement that the aim
of the emergency constitution is "to reassure the public that the situation is
under control, and that the state is taking effective short-term actions to prevent
'
a second strike,"47
Ackerman insisted that he had expounded "a two-prong test,
and Professor Cole entirely ignore[d] the second prong."4' The problem with
this response, as Cole pointed out, was that the precondition in the second
prong of the statement was not based on actually making the public safer; it
stated "only that the purpose is to 'reassure the public' that the state is taking
effective steps, not to ensure that the steps are actually effective." 9
Following this exchange, Ackerman reformulated the reassurance interest
in Before the Next Attack, stating that the "[r]eassurance takes two forms:
symbolic and functional."5 As in his earlier essay, the symbolic form of
reassurance is concerned to increase subjective security in the aftermath of a
terrorist attack.5 By contrast, the functional form of reassurance is concerned
with safeguarding objective security. Its aim is to "prevent a devastating
second strike."52 Its premise is that the terrorist strike has generated
bureaucratic confusion and that the initial strike "greatly increases the
probability of a second major attack."53 But whilst this insistence on both
symbolic and functional reassurance may seem to address Cole's criticism of
the original exploratory essay, it unjustifiably assumes that objective and
subjective security necessarily pull in the same direction. This flaw is at the
root of a number of the criticisms which have been leveled at Ackerman's
proposal. For example, it is unclear whether there is any place within
Ackerman's scheme for measures which provide one form of reassurance

45.
David Cole, The Priorityof Morality: The Emergency Constitution'sBlind Spot, 113 YALE
L.J. 1753, 1796 (2004).
46.
Bruce Ackerman, This is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1880 (2004).
47.
Ackerman, supra note 39, at 103 1.
48.
Ackerman, supra note 46, at 1880.
49.
Cole, supra note 45, at 1797.
50.
ACKERMAN, supra note 37, at 45.
51.
Ackerman writes that the emergency constitution is designed to confront the "pervasive
uncertainty throughout the country about our collective capacity to maintain the fabric of public order" that
follows a terrorist attack. Id.at 45. It is premised on the assumption that a successful second strike "will
grievously demoralize the general public," which could in turn "[pave] the way for a new cycle of political
demagoguery." Id.at 46-47.
52.
Id. at 45.
53.
Id. at46.
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(symbolic/functional), but not the other. Tribe and Gudridge have questioned
whether there is any role within Ackerman's proposal for "the thankless work
of the plain-vanilla variety that needs to get done."54 In terms of preventing
recurrence of a terrorist attack, changing how information is processed,
translated and collated may, they argue, be among the "most effective
responses" possible.55 Yet since these changes are "not nearly dramatic enough
to reassure any but the least emotional among us, ' 56 it is unclear how such
measures can be squared with the symbolic rationale ofAckerman's emergency
constitution. The declaration of an emergency may, in itself, have some
symbolic value, but in the absence of some headline-grabbing powers it is likely
to ring hollow.
Conversely, there may be some measures which provide great symbolic
reassurance, but have little effect on objective security. Given his original
essay's emphasis on symbolic reassurance and its focus on preventive
detention, it may be inferred that Ackerman believes that a campaign of
preventive detention will increase subjective security. But would such a
campaign actually be effective in helping prevent a second terrorist strike?
Ackerman's premise that one successful terrorist strike increases the probability
of a second is based on the assumption that the terrorists are well-organized and
so "have probably prepared the way for a series of strikes;"57 but if they are as
well-organized as Ackerman supposes, it is likely that they will have also made
plans to avoid being swept up in the preventive detention dragnet. It is, thus,
entirely possible that the preventive detention campaign will have little bearing
on any plans the terrorists might have for a second strike. This is all the more
likely given the lack of success enjoyed by previous campaigns of preventive
detention in the United States. As Cole points out, for example, the preventive
detention campaign which followed the 9/11 attacks was "spectacularly
unsuccessful. 5 8 Let's suppose, however, that Ackerman's assertion that, whilst
the "dragnet will undoubtedly sweep many innocents into detention ... it may
well catch a few key actors: disrupting the second strike, saving lots of lives,
and deflecting a body blow to the body politic"59 is correct. Even if such a
dragnet did catch a few key actors, it does not follow that the public's concern
about its safety will be relieved. Vermeule argues that an emergency
constitution will have little or no effect on the public's concern about its

54.
Patrick O. Gudridge & Laurence H. Tribe, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J.
1801, 1814 (2004).
55. Id. at 1813.
56.
Id.
57.
ACKERMAN, supra note 37, at 46.
58.
Cole, supra note 45, at 1753.
59.
ACKERMAN, supra note 37, at 47 (emphasis added).
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safety,6 ° "[w]aving the Constitution at the public will not help when the public
believes that the Constitution itself is being threatened; much less will a mere
framework statute provide a barrier against widespread panic"6 -whilst Tribe
and Gudridge warn that "[a]ny declaration of emergency may be perceived as
a sign of panic or as a political stunt rather than as a sign that the government
has everything under control."62 Strikingly, Ackerman offers no empirical
evidence in support of his assertion that the declaration of a state of emergency
and the deployment of a campaign of preventive detention, will reassure the
public. In fact, what evidence there is suggests that resorting to the emergency
constitution could exacerbate the public's fears, not relieve them.63 Given that
when people discuss a low-probability risk their concern rises even if the
discussion consists mostly of apparently trustworthy assurances that the
likelihood of harm is infinitesimal (a point which will be explored further
below),' publicizing the fact that the emergency constitution has been invoked
could increase public concern. This would mean that the functional and the
symbolic dimensions of Ackerman's proposal actually conflict; the prevention
detention campaign might assist in preventing a second terrorist strike, but
would do so at the cost of increased public anxiety.
So, at the heart of Ackerman's proposal lies a tension caused by his
simplistic welding together of the symbolic and functional forms of
reassurance. His assertion that the "functional argument is entirely compatible
with the symbolic aspect of the state of emergency"6 5 offers little guidance on
the role within his proposal of measures which offer only one of these forms of
reassurance, and overlooks the possibility that the two forms of reassurance
could actually conflict. Like Posner, his work is thus marred by a failure to
clearly distinguish between objective and subjective security.
B. Security in the Subjective Sense
Having established the importance of distinguishing between objective and
subjective security, this part focuses on the question whether counterterrorism
laws should be enacted on the basis that they will increase subjective security.
Jeremy Waldron, for one, has doubted whether increased subjective security is
capable of justifying draconian responses to terrorist attacks, "[n]o doubt the

60.

See Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75

FORDHAM L.REv. 631, 644 (2006).

61.
Id.
62.
Gudridge & Tribe, supra note 54, at 1814.
63.
Id.
64.
Ali Siddiq Alhakami & Paul Slovic, A PsychologicalStudy of the InverseRelationshipbetween
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psychological reassurance that people derive from this is a consequential gain
from the loss of liberty. But whether it is the sort of gain that should count
morally is another question."66
Yet, there are understandable reasons for wanting to dispel fear in the
aftermath of a terrorist atrocity. Official definitions of terrorism recognize that
one of its central objectives is to provoke fear and anxiety. The United Nation's
(UN) Security Council Resolution 1566, for example, states that the purpose of
terrorism is to "intimidate a population or compel a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. ' 67 Moreover,
the feelings of anxiety experienced in response to recent attacks such as 9/11
are intensified by their theatricality and vividness, whilst twenty-first century
technology ensures that the images of such attacks have a global reach.68
Responding to a terrorist attack by seeking to reduce fear, is thus, central to
dealing with terrorism. And while, as will be explained below, the hysteria
generated by a terrorist attack might cause the public to overreact, in some
situations it could be rational to legislate to relieve even irrational fear. As
Cass Sunstein has explained:
Fear, whether rational or not, is itself a cost, and it is likely to lead to
a range of other costs, in the form of countless ripple effects,
including a reluctance to fly or to appear in public places.... If, for
example, people are afraid to fly, the economy will suffer in multiple
ways; so too if people are afraid to send or to receive mail. The
reduction of even baseless fear is a social good.69
Notwithstanding these arguments, the contention of this essay is that it is
inappropriate to pursue this objective through the enactment of new laws. This
is not to say that it is not desirable to reduce public anxiety about terrorism. It
is simply to say that counterterrorism legislation should not be enacted on the
ground that it will increase subjective security. This is for three reasons: first,
cognitive evidence suggests that passing such legislation is unlikely to have this
effect; second, the aim of reducing anxiety about terrorism is at odds with the
politics of fear which characterizes contemporary society; and third, the
enactment of new laws nurtures a vulnerability-led approach to terrorism which
exacerbates public anxiety.
66.
Waldron, supra note 3, at 209.
67.
S.C. Res. 1566 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566, (Oct. 8,2004); Contrast George P. Fletcher, The
Indefinable Concept of Terrorism,4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 894, 902, 903 (2006).
68.
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1. The Cognitive Evidence
Cognitive research suggests that counterterrorism legislation is actually
unlikely to assuage public fears about terrorism.7" First, there are a range of
qualitative factors which can make particular risks a special cause of concern.7"
Since people show a disproportionate fear of risks which are unfamiliar and
which are hard to control,72 terrorists acts are liable to cause a reaction which
is unjustified by the actual magnitude of the risk. Second, when "thinking
about risks, people rely on certain heuristics... which serve to simplify their
inquiry., 73 One of these is the availability heuristic, which involves the
assessment of the magnitude of risks by asking whether examples readily come
to mind. 7' Given the intrinsic nature of terrorism and the publicity that terrorist
acts attract, exaggerated risk perceptions are likely in the period following a
terrorist attack. Attempting to reassure the public by describing steps taken to
prevent further attacks sustains the availability and salience of examples of
previous attacks, and so operates to reinforce exaggerated perceptions of the
risk posed.75 Third, people are insensitive to variations in low probabilities.76
So even if counterterrorism legislation succeeds in reducing the statistical threat
posed by terrorism--which, as will be explained below, should not simply be
assumed-it does not follow that this will affect people's perception of the risk.
Fourth, people are prone to "probability neglect."77 This is where their
attention focuses on the bad outcome itself, and as a result they are inattentive
to the fact that it is unlikely to occur.78 Since this is especially acute when
emotions are intensely engaged, probability neglect is highly likely in the
aftermath of terrorism. So, publicizing the legislative steps taken to combat
terrorism could perpetuate fear, by reminding people of the horror of terrorist
attacks, thereby engaging their emotions and causing them to disregard the issue
of probability altogether.
Sunstein also identifies some social influences which impact on human
cognition. Social "cascades" or "bandwagons" occur where details of a salient
event are passed from one person to another so that the event becomes available
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to increasingly large numbers of people.79 "Group polarization" describes the
fact that, "[w]hen like-minded people deliberate with one another, they
typically end up accepting a more extreme version of the views with which they
began., 8' This means that if several people who fear terrorism speak to one
another about it, "their fear is likely to increase as a result of internal
discussions. 81 As well as describing the influences which operate when
ordinary people interact with one another, these processes capture the role
played by media coverage of fear-inducing events.82 The intense media
coverage devoted to terrorism ensures that terrorist attacks retain their salience
and availability in the minds of the public, exacerbating the effects of the
features of human cognition-particularly the availability heuristic and
probability neglect-outlined above. Against this background, Sunstein poses
the question "can government officials effectively provide assurance and
dampen concern?" then continues:
If officials want to reduce fear, the best approach may well be simple:
Alter the public's focus. I have noted that discussions of lowprobability risks tend to heighten public concern, even if those
discussions consist largely ofreassurance. Perhaps the most effective
way of reducing fear of a low probability risk is simply to discuss
something else and to let time do the rest. 3
In terms of increasing subjective security, the cognitive evidence suggests
that grand-sounding declarations about the steps being taken to protect the
public are unlikely to alleviate public anxiety. To the extent that they are
designed to have a symbolic effect, new laws aimed at reassuring the public
would, thus, be misguided.
2. The Political Construction of a State of Fear
The question whether government officials can effectively provide
assurance and dampen concern assumes that they actually desire reductions in
public levels of anxiety about terrorism. But the reality is that politicians
frequently seek to justify their counterterrorism policies by referring to past
terrorist atrocities in order to trigger both availability and salience, drawing on
the features of human cognition outlined above to amplify the terrorist threat.
Noting this trend, one commentator has succinctly asserted that, "rather than
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assuaging fear, Homeland Security incites and reinforces its own spurious
necessity.""
Using the 9/11 attacks in this way is the politics of fear. David Altheide
explains that "[t]he politics of fear results when social control is perceived to
have broken down and/or a higher level of control is called for by a situation or
events, such as a 'terrorist attack."' 85 It is "decision makers' promotion and use
of audience beliefs and assumptions about danger, risk, and fear in order to
achieve certain goals."86 Employing this technique, political leaders promote
fear in their media messages and strive to sound tougher than their rivals. 7 A
stark example is the reaction to a New York Times interview with Democrat
challenger John Kerry during the 2004 presidential campaign. In an apparent
lapse (given the tenor of the rest of his campaign), Kerry said that "[w]e have
to get back to the place we were, where terrorists are not the focus of our lives,
but they're a nuisance," adding that-like other law enforcement problems such
as prostitution, illegal gambling and organized crime-terrorism will never be
completely eliminated, so the objective should be to "reduce it ... to a level
where it isn't on the rise [and] isn't threatening people's lives every day, and
fundamentally, it's something that you continue to fight, but it's not threatening
the fabric of your life."8 8 Republicans responded immediately by strongly
condemning these remarks-Bush's campaign chairman described them as "a
pre-9/11 view of the world" while the Republican Party chairman said they
demonstrated "a disconcerting pre-September 11 mindset that will not make our
country safer" 89-- whilst Democrats refuted suggestions that Kerry believed the
terrorist threat had been overblown, instead insisting that he would fight the war
on terror more vigorously (and successfully) than Bush had done.9"
Altheide himself stresses that he is not suggesting that fear itself is
intrinsically bad.9' Sometimes fear can be beneficial, such as where it "supplies
motivation that can overcome preexisting inertia."92 Rather, Altheide's
argument is that fear "is promoted and exploited by leaders for their own
survival and policies rather than that of their audiences."93 For present
purposes, the important point is the incongruity between this politics of fear and
84.
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the enactment of new laws ostensibly designed to increase subjective security.
There is little point in passing new laws with the avowed purpose of assuaging
the public's concern about terrorism if the politics of fear will be employed to
establish that such legislation is needed.
3. The Contemporary Emphasis on Safety
What makes the politics of fear so effective is the importance which
contemporary society places on safety. Ulrich Beck contends that, whilst the
central issue in industrial society was distribution in a society of scarcity, the
new modernity-risk society-revolves around the management of technoscientifically produced risks." Although risk is of course "not an invention of
modernity,"95 technological progress has given risk a different character.
Unlike the localized risks common to industrial society, the dangers of the risk
society are neither spatially limited nor temporally limited.96 They are often
imperceptible to the senses.97 They are global in nature, threatening even "selfdestruction of all life on Earth."9 " One of the features of the risk society
described by Beck which is of particular relevance here, is its emphasis of
safety:
The dream of class society is that everyone wants and ought to have
a share of the pie. The utopia of the risk society is that everyone
should be sparedfrom poisoning.... The driving force in the class
society can be summarized in the phrase: I am hungry! The
movement set in motion by the risk society, on the other hand, is
expressed in the statement: I am afraid! The commonality of anxiety
takes the place of the commonality of need.9

Some have taken issue with Beck's central claims. British sociologist
Frank Furedi rejects the connection between risk and advances in science and
knowledge, asserting that people in contemporary Western societies in fact
enjoy an unprecedented level of personal safety.' Nonetheless, he agrees that
"[s]afety has become the fundamental value of our times."'' In contemporary
society, he claims, there is a pervasive sense of being at risk, which is caused
94.

ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 19 (Mark Ritter trans. 1992).

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.at21.
at22.
See id.
See, e.g.,
id.
at27.
Id.at21.
Id.

100.

FRANK FUREDI, CULTURE OF FEAR: RSK-TAKING AND THE MORALITY OF LOW EXPECTATION

56-57 (Continuum 2005) (1997).
101. Id.at 1.

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 15:1

by growing uncertainty about human relationships and a weakening of trust in
society and which means that there is "a heightened state of readiness to react
to whatever danger is brought to the attention of the public."1 °2 This pervasive
sense of being at risk results in a vulnerability-led response to the terrorist
threat, so that instead of asking the question of "what do we know?" we
speculate and ask the "what if?" question.' °3 The problem with this approach
is that even "previously untroubled aspects of life [can be] transformed into a
speculative risk."1 ° 4 This is illustrated by the fact that, by 2004, the number of
potential terrorist targets on the list compiled by the Department of Homeland
Security reached 80,000, including some miniature golf courses and Weeki
Wachee Springs, a roadside water park in Florida. 5 Furedi laments:
It is interesting to note that the traditional anti-terrorist declarations
from politicians, that terror will not be allowed to succeed in
preventing us from going about our daily business, are less in
evidence following the September 11th attacks. Instead, there
appearsto be a tendency to embrace the idea of society underthreat
andtreat
it as a welcome organizingprincipleforpolitical
andsocial
6

life. 1

Pointing out that a vulnerability-led approach "threatens to further inflate
public anxiety" and also "provides an opportunity for those promoting
intentional risks, ' °7 he urges the need to balance vulnerability with resilience.
In a similar vein, Philip Heymann has urged that policy-makers responding to
events such as 9/11 should consider the value Americans place on courage and
decency. 108
So, if the goal is to increase public levels of reassurance, the most
promising strategy would seem to be to alter the public's focus whilst
emphasizing the importance of resilience and courage. This is not incompatible
with efforts to increase security in the objective sense; such work should of
course continue (and if it is successful it should consolidate efforts to shift the
public's focus). To attempt to increase subjective security by enacting new
laws would, however, be counterproductive. Not only would the necessity of
102.
103.
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such laws be established using the politics of fear, triggering the availability
and salience of previous terrorist attacks, but passing such laws would merely
reinforce the vulnerability-led approach to terrorism. For this reason, the goal
of counterterrorism legislation should be regarded as increasing security in the
objective sense by actually making the public safer.
C. Security in the Objective Sense
Even if we take security as it is used in the balance metaphor in the
objective sense of actually making people safer, problems remain. The
metaphor simply invites us to consider what weight should be attached to
security. On this approach, those who oppose a proposed counterterrorism
measure either-because they believe it will be unsuccessful in combating
terrorist activity or it will have incidental effects that will result in diminutions
in security and/or opportunity costs in terms of other efforts to enhance our
security which outweigh any security gains likely to be procured by the measure
under consideration-are unjustifiably presented as attaching less weight to
security than the measure's proponents. Where a counterterrorism measure is
being debated, this essay accordingly proposes a four-step approach to
(objective) security. First, it should be a necessary prerequisite that the
measure will prevent or impede terrorist activity. Second, any incidental effects
of the proposed measure which will result in diminutions in security must be
considered. Third, any opportunity costs in terms of other measures to combat
the terrorist threat must be assessed. Fourth, it must be asked whether the
measure has other opportunity costs in terms of our efforts to combat other
threats to our security.
1. Will the Measure Prevent or Impede Terrorist Activity?
The starting point for discussion of a proposed counterterrorism measure
should be to assess whether it will prevent or impede terrorist activity. This
assessment should include consideration of both the extent of the expected
preventive/impedimentary effect and the likelihood of such effect occurring.
If the measure will have no preventive/impedimentary effect, or the effect will
be no more than de minimis, it should not be enacted. This assertion might
seem trite, but the fact is that there is more uncertainty than certainty over the
effectiveness of counterterrorism programs. A Campbell systematic review of
counterterrorism evaluation research which surveyed over 20,000 works
(articles, books, government and technical reports, online documents, websites,
unpublished material) related to terrorism and political violence found just
seven studies which satisfied the reviewers' requirement of being a moderately
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rigorous evaluation study of a counterterrorism program. 09 Meta-analysis of
the eighty-six findings contained in these seven studies showed that many ofthe
(small subset of) strategies which have been evaluated did not have a
statistically discernible effect on reducing terrorism across time, and in some
cases actually led to increases in terrorism." 0 Of course, there are a number of
factors which may help explain why there is this dearth of evaluative work.'
But, as this study suggests, it is also the case that there is a common tendency
to unjustifiably assume that particular measures will improve our security. One
particularly stark example of this relates to legal thresholds for the exercise of
investigative powers; it is frequently assumed that loosening such thresholds
will necessarily increase our security against the terrorist threat. The balance
metaphor fortifies this assumption, since it predicates a connection between
eroding civil liberties safeguards and enhancing security. The possibility that
there might be an optimum point, beyond which further loosening of the legal
threshold will actually reduce security, not enhance it, is ignored.
A useful example in this regard is section 505 of the USA PATRIOT
Act," 2 which amended the FBI's national security letter (NSL) authority over
records from communications services, financial institutions and credit
agencies. 1"' Prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, the FBI could only access such
records if the Director, or a designee in a position not lower than Deputy
Assistant Director, certified that the information sought was relevant to an
authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation and that there were specific
and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person or entity to whom
the information sought pertained was a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power.l"' Section 505 extended the power of approval to include a designee at
Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in charge of a bureau field office
designated by the Director.'
It replaced the "specific and articulable facts"
standard with a requirement that the Director--or his designee-certify that the
records requested were relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, with the proviso
109. Leslie W. Kennedy, Cynthia Lum & Alison Sherley, Are counter-terrorismstrategieseffective?
The results ofthe Campbellsystematic review on counter-terrorismevaluationresearch, 2 J. EXPERMENTAL
CRIMINOLOGY 489, 495 (2006). The search ran up to the end of December 2004. Id. Note that, since the
Campbell process tends to focus on quantitative evaluations, it is possible that useful qualitative evaluations
exist.
110. Id.at508.
111. Idat510-1I.
112. USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 18 U.S.C. (115 Stat.) 272,365 [hereinafter
USA PATRIOT ACT].
113. Christopher P. Raab, FightingTerrorismin an ElectronicAge: Does the PatriotAct Unduly
Compromise Our Civil Liberties?,DuKE L. & TECH. REv. 3, 1 (2006).
114. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 112, at 365.
115. Id.
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that an investigation of a United States person could not be conducted solely on
16
the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
When the USA PATRIOT Act was reauthorized in March 2006, the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act".7 purported to address
concerns about the breadth of the power conferred by section 505 by, amongst
other things: explicitly providing that a NSL may be judicially reviewed;
explicitly providing that the recipient of a NSL may disclose receipt to those to
whom such disclosure is necessary to comply with the request and/or to an
attorney in order to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the
request; providing that a nondisclosure order does not automatically attach to
a NSL; and providing for judicial review of a nondisclosure order attached to
a NSL. 8
One of the principal criticisms of section 505 was that it loosened the legal
threshold for the issuance of a NSL; it replaced the "specific and articulable
facts" standard with the lower standard of relevance, and it removed the
requirement that the records pertain to a foreign power or an agent of one, thus
permitting the collection of information about persons who were not the target
of an investigation." 9 The balance metaphor pitches this debate over the
threshold for the making ofa NSL as a straightforward clash between the values
of security and liberty. The assumption is that security requires the threshold
to be loosened as much as possible, liberty requires the threshold to be as tight
as possible, and the task is to strike a balance between these competing
demands. But this is unduly simplistic. First, it is erroneous to suggest that
someone who supports a looser threshold necessarily attaches less weight to
civil liberties. As will be explained below, people who attach equal importance
to liberty may nonetheless differ over how to satisfy the demands of this value.
Second, it is mistaken to assume that loosening the threshold for the exercise
of an investigative power will invariably improve the protection of our security.
Sometimes, of course, some relaxation of the legal threshold for the exercise of
an investigative power might aid investigators seeking to safeguard our
security. For example, Michael J. Woods, former chief of the FBI's National
116. 1dat367.
117. USAPATRIOTImprovementand Reauthorization Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 18 U.S.C.
(120 Stat.) 192, 197 [hereinafter USA PATRIOT ACT 2005].
118. As far challenges to nondisclosure orders are concerned, note that the Act provides that if the
Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or the Director of the FBI (or in
the case of a request by a department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Government other than the
Department of Justice, the head or deputy head of such department, agency, or instrumentality) certifies that
disclosure may endanger the national security of the United States or interfere with diplomatic relations, such
certification shall be treated as conclusive unless the court finds that the certification was made in bad faith.
The same applies to recertifications. Id. at 212.
119. See Timothy Edgar & Witold Walczak, We Can Be Both Safe andFree: How the PatriotAct
Threatens Civil Liberties, 76 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 21, 27 (2005); Raab, supra note 113, 21.
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Security Law Unit, has asserted that, in the context of counterintelligence
operations, the "specific and articulable facts" threshold is too high, "[a] clear
goal of counterintelligence is to identify spies and international terrorists. If an
investigator has specific and articulable facts 2that
a target is an international
0
terrorist, she has already achieved that goal."'1
It would be mistaken to suppose that relaxing the legal threshold for the
exercise of an investigative power will necessarilyresult in investigators being
more effective in their efforts to protect our security. Such a view assumes that
legal thresholds invariably hinder investigators' efforts and hamper their
effectiveness. Not only does this perpetuate the erroneous dichotomy between
legal rules and discretion-an issue which we will consider further in Part
III.B. 1 below-but it also ignores the possibility that legal thresholds could
have a beneficial effect. It is quite conceivable that, by structuring
investigators' discretion and promoting high standards of scrutiny, diligence
and professionalism, a legal threshold for the exercise of an investigative power
could sometimes result in investigators being more effective in their attempts
to safeguard our security than if a looser threshold were in place. 2 ' Whether
this is the case in any particular context is, of course, an empirical question
which would need to be addressed. The point is that the balance metaphor
obscures this by equating the erosion of civil liberties safeguards with enhanced
security.
As noted above, section 505 significantly expanded the FBI's preexisting
authority to obtain information through NSLs, by providing that records relating
to individuals who are not the subject of an investigation may be obtained as
long as the information is relevant to an authorized investigation.' 22 Case
agents are thus able to access information about individuals who are several
steps removed from the subject of an investigation." 3 This broader power,
coupled with how the FBI has responded to the criticism it received for failing
to prevent the 9/11 attacks-senior FBI officials have been reported as saying
that the Bureau now casts a much wider net in an effort to pre-empt any future
attack' 24-has resulted in an enormous increase in the number ofNSL requests,
as the FBI try to generate leads as well as pursue them.'2 5 The review of the
FBI's use of NSLs conducted by the Justice Department's Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) found that the FBI issued approximately 8500 NSL
120. Michael J. Woods, Counterintelligenceand Access to TransactionalRecords: A Practical
History of USA PatriotAct Section 215, 1 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 37, 63 (2005).
121. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, At War With Liberty, 14 (No. 3) AM. PROSPECT (2003), at A5.
122. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 112; see Barton Gellman, The FBI's Secret Scrutiny, WASH.
POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A10.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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requests in 2000 (the year prior to the introduction of the USA PATRIOT Act),
compared to 39,000 in 2003, 56,000 in 2004 and 47,000 in 2005.126 Moreover,
after the initial review by the case agent who sought it, the information derived
from a NSL is retained.127 It may be disseminated among federal agencies, and
is used by Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) in analytical intelligence products
such as "link analysis.', 2' The combined effect of section 505's loosening of
the legal threshold for the issuance of a NSL and the FBI's desire to avoid
criticism in the aftermath of any future attack has thus been the accumulation
of a vast sea of information. The FBI's response in December 2003 to
intelligence hinting at a New Year's Eve attack in Las Vegas-intelligence
which caused the Department of Homeland Security to issue an orange alert on
the twenty-first of that month-provides a stark example. 2 9 The chief of the
FBI's Proactive Data Exploitation Unit was charged with the task ofassembling
a real-time census of every visitor to the city over a two-week period-a total
of roughly one million possible suspects.' An interagency task force sought
to pull together the records of every hotel guest, everyone who rented a car or
truck, every lease on a storage space, and every airplane passenger who landed
in the city.'' But the operation uncovered no suspects, and the orange alert
ended on January 10, 2004.132 In fact, when asked for an example of an
occasion where expanded surveillance powers had made a difference, one
assistant FBI director doubted whether "such an example exists."' 33 Against
this background, and doubts about the effectiveness of data mining more
generally,3 4 it is plausible to ask whether a tighter legal threshold for the
issuance of NSLs might, by channeling the FBI's efforts, actually increase our
security. At present the FBI's desire to avoid blame should a terrorist attack
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occur leads it to expend much resource on licentious searches for information
on individuals only tenuously linked with the subject of an investigation. Such
channeling would help encourage the FBI to concentrate on pursuing identified
leads instead of speculatively searching for new ones. In this sense, then, the
changes introduced by the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization
Act-in particular the provision that a NSL may be judicially reviewed and that
the recipient of a NSL may disclose receipt to an attorney in order to obtain
legal advice with respect to the request135-may, notwithstanding any value
they have as civil liberties safeguards, be a step in the right direction in security
terms. But the balance metaphor discounts this possibility out of hand. Just as
it erroneously equates the erosion of civil liberties safeguards with enhanced
security, the metaphor assumes that the introduction of provisions designed to
further protect civil liberties will diminish security.
2. Does the Measure Have Incidental Effects Which Will
Diminish Our Security?
Determining whether a proposed counterterrorism measure will prevent or
impede terrorist activity is only the first step. It is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition. A measure which will prevent/impede some terrorist
activity could in other respects have security costs. For example, it has been
suggested that "the global surveillance dragnet alienates the very communities
from whom intelligence agencies currently need assistance, making it difficult
to get crucial tips from them and difficult to recruit the law-enforcement and
intelligence officers needed from their ranks."' 36 The argument here is not that
we should attach less weight to security, nor that surveillance initiatives will
never prevent or impede any terrorist activity; rather, it is that any security
gains achieved by this surveillance are outweighed by the reduction in security
caused by the loss of human intelligence and recruitment to the intelligence
agencies from minority communities.' 37 By the same token, whilst austere
measures might have some value in combating terrorist activity, they can also
foster resentment and ultimately increase the number of people who support,
and are willing to commit, terrorist acts-a point which has been underscored
by Martha Minow:
National security in a democracy entails not only protecting borders
and citizens from physical threat, but also promoting democratic
accountability and respect for human rights. This broader conception
...
rejects the assumption that the nation must sacrifice human rights
135.
136.
137.

USA PATRIOT ACT 2005, supra note 117, at 197.
WEBB, supra note 134, at 240.
See id.
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for security and instead treats both physical security and human rights

as indispensable to national security.' 38
The second step of the proposed approach to security is thus to consider
whether the measure in question has any incidental effects, such as these, which
will diminish our security.
3. Are There Any Opportunity Costs in Terms of Other
Measures to Combat the Terrorist Threat?
Expending time and resources on some initiatives necessarily means
diverting resources away from others. Maureen Webb has strongly criticized
the volume of resources invested in global surveillance initiatives since 9/11,
stating that this has "[diverted] crucial resources and efforts away from the kind
of investments that would make people safer.' ' 139 "Good information about
specific threats," she states, "is usually obtained through human not technological intelligence, by agents capable of infiltrating the circles where these
threats exist."' 40 She argues that "these were the kind of critical resources that
were lacking in U.S. security agencies" at the time of 9/11.14 Not only was
there a dearth of agents on the ground collecting human intelligence, but
translators were lacking too-the al-Qaeda messages reportedly intercepted the
day before the attacks ("[t]omorrow is zero hour," "[t]he match is about to
begin") were not translated until days later, and three years after the attacks
more than 120,000 hours of recorded telephone calls had yet to be translated by
the FBI. 42 So it does not follow that a measure should be enacted simply
because it will prevent/impede some terrorist activity. As well as possible
incidental reductions in security, consideration must also be given to whether
particular measures have opportunity costs within the counterterrorism context.
4. Are There Any Opportunity Costs in Terms of Measures to Combat Other
Threats to Our Security?
As well as opportunity costs within the sphere of counterterrorism,
consideration must also be given to whether the measure in question has
opportunity costs in other contexts. There are many different threats to our
security; to focus exclusively on the threat from terrorism would be to ignore
138. Martha Minow, The Constitutionas Black Box DuringNationalEmergencies: Comment on
Bruce Ackerman's Before the Next Attack: PreservingCivil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism, 75 FORDHAM
L. REv. 593, 602 (2006).
139. WEBB, supra note 134, at 239 (emphasis original).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 239-40.
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other threats which are also significant. This has been highlighted by John43
Mueller. He contends that the threat from terrorism has been "overblown"'1
asserting that "terrorism, in reasonable context, actually causes rather little
damage, and the likelihood that any individual will become a victim in most
places is microscopic."'" To illustrate this, he points out that the number of
Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s is about the
same as the number of people killed during the same period by lightning, or by
accident-causing deer, or by severe allergic reaction to peanuts.14 In fact, he
adds, in almost all years the total number of people worldwide who die at the
hands of international terrorists is46not much more than the number who drown
in bathtubs in the United States.
Using statistics for years gone-by to assess the extent of the threat from
terrorism at present and in the future is problematic, for it fails to take into
account the way in which terrorism is changing. Philip Bobbitt explains that
"terrorism derives its ideology in reaction to the raisond'etre of the dominant
constitutional order, at the same time negating and rejecting that form's unique
ideology but mimicking the form's structural characteristics."' 147 So, as the
market state has superseded the nation state as the dominant constitutional
order, a new form of terrorism--market state terrorism--has emerged, "of
which the group called al-Qaeda is the initial, disturbing example."'' 4 Whilst
one might question whether, instead of couching the concepts "nation state" and
"market state" in ontological terms, they should instead be presented as
Weberian ideal types-the claim is not that the nation-state existed in a pure
form and is now passing away to be replaced by another form of constitutional
order; the claim is that a fundamental change in the constitutional order is
occurring and that these concepts are useful analytical tools which enable us to
see and to expound the nature of this change more clearly-Bobbitt's account
does usefully draw out some of the principal features of the emerging market
state terrorism. 149 It "will be just as global, networked, decentralized, devolved
and rely just as much on outsourcing and incentivizing as the market state."' 50
And, importantly, it will be more lethal than the nation state terrorism which
preceded it; the oft-cited remark that "[tierrorists want a lot of people watching

143.

See generally MUELLER, supranote 105.

144.

John Mueller, Why Isn't There More Violence?, 13 SEC. STUD. 191, 195 (2004).

145.

Id.

146.

Id.

147.

BOBBrrr, supra note 68, at 26.

148.

Id. at 44.

149.

Id. at 44-63.

150.

Id. at 45.
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and a lot of people listening, and not a lot of people dead"'' will no longer hold
true. Bobbitt's account resonates with Beck's application of his risk society
thesis to the context of terrorism.5 2 Beck states that "the dangers from
terrorism increase exponentially with technical progress,"' 5 3 adding: "all the
risk conflicts that are stored away as potential could now be intentionally
unleashed.'5 4 Every advance from gene technology to nanotechnology opens a
' 55
'Pandora's box' that could be used as a terrorist's toolkit."'
In spite of this difficulty with using statistics for years gone-by to calculate
the magnitude of the present and future terrorist threat (which Mueller himself
does concede),' 56 the basic point remains that there are a number of other
significant threats to our security. Investing time and money in new
counterterrorism initiatives may have an opportunity cost in terms of the
expended resources which could have been used to combat these other threats.
For example, the increases in the FBI's budget post-9/1 1 have been insufficient
to pay for all the terrorism work it is now required to do. This has resulted in
funds being shifted from other programs, such as fighting crime. Some police
chiefs have consequently attributed the rise in the rate of violent crime in 2005
in part to the pressure to divert resources and personnel to counterterrorism
efforts.'5 7 Similarly, inept governmental measures to deal with the results of
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 may have been partly attributable to the relatively
small sum made available in grants to improve preparedness for natural
disasters compared to terrorism.'
Moreover, it has been suggested that the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's failed performance in New Orleans
was the result of its assimilation within the Department of Homeland Security,
151.

Brian Jenkins, InternationalTerrorism: A New Mode of Conflict?, in DAVID CARLTON &

CAROLO SCHAERF, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND WORLD SECURrrY 15 (1975).

152. See BOBBITT, supra note 68, at 55-60. See generally Ulrich Beck, The Terrorist Threat:
World Risk Society Revisited, 19 THEORY, CULTURE & SoC'Y 39 (2002).
153. Beck, supra note 152, at 45.
154. Id.
155. Id at 45-46. British sociologist Anthony Giddens has argued that "[t]he advent of risk society
has strong implications for rethinking the political agenda in this country and elsewhere . ...The issues
I have discussed demand to be brought more directly into the political arena. A party able to address them
cogently would be in a prime position in the political encounters that will unfold over the coming few years."
Anthony Giddens, Risk andResponsibility,62 MOD. L. REV. 1, 5, 7 (1999). These comments are of especial
relevance to global terrorism. See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (1998).

156. Mueller recognizes that things "[c]ould change if international terrorists are able to assemble
sufficient weaponry or devise new tactics to kill masses of people and if they come to do so routinely...."
Mueller, supra note 144, at 196. He accordingly urges the importance of controlling the world's supply of
nuclear material and of ensuring that chemical plants are not turned into weapons of mass destruction by
insiders. MUELLER, supra note 105, at 17, 20.
157. MUELLER, supranote 105, at 32.
158. Id.
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which "reduced its preparedness by pushing it away from a focus on natural
disasters towards postures more appropriate for a civil defense role in the War
on Terror."' 5 9 And whilst, in February 2006, the president's fiscal year 2007
budget increased the funding allocated to the Departments of Homeland
Security (by between five and seven percent) and Defense (by five percent, plus
an additional $120 billion towards the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq), it made
cuts to Medicare and a host of domestic spending programs. 6 This tendency
to focus on the threat from terrorism at the expense of other threats to our
security may partially be explained by the cognitive finding that people are
more willing to tolerate familiar risks than unfamiliar risks, even if they are
statistically equivalent.' 61 In Government, however, it is exacerbated by an
attitude known colloquially as CYA--"cover your ass." One commentator has
described this as a fear "of being blamed after an attack for having vetoed,
opposed, or shortchanged precisely the program that might, after the fact, be
determined as the measure that could have prevented it, had it only been
implemented as proposed."' 162 It "operates within regular departments, the
intelligence community, the military, and law enforcement agencies throughout
the country, to weaken and slow our system's capacity to distinguish useful
from wasteful activity. 1 63 Such an attitude disregards consideration of the
opportunity costs of diverting resources to counterterrorism initiatives.
In summary, when assessing a proposed counterterrorism measure,
consideration must be given to:
whether the measure will prevent or impede terrorist activity;
whether the measure has incidental effects which could diminish
our security against terrorism;
iii) whether the measure has opportunity costs in terms of our
efforts to combat the terrorist threat; and
iv) whether the measure has other opportunity costs in terms of
efforts to combat other threats to our security.
i)
ii)

The balance metaphor does not make clear exactly what is placed in the
security pan. One interpretation could be that, of the four considerations just
outlined, only (i) is placed in this pan. The difficulty with this is that the image
of the scales suggests that the only costs of a counterterrorism measure are
diminished liberties, thereby precluding an assessment of considerations (ii),
(iii), and (iv) above. An alternative interpretation could be that the
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

LUSTIcK, supra note 90, at 86.
Id.at 22.
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 73, at 36.
LusT1CK, supra note 90, at 90.
Id. at 89.
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metaphorical scales are only utilized where the gain in security under
consideration (i) exceeds any loss under considerations (ii), (iii), and (iv), and
that what is placed in the security pan is this net benefit. If this is the case,
however, this needs to be made plain. To simply state that the task in
counterterrorism policy is to decide what weight we attach to security (relative
to liberty) obscures this. As we have seen, individuals may hold widely
diverging views on each of the four considerations above. The four-step
approach outlined in this essay would open up consideration of these different
perspectives.
III. LIBERTY
If, having applied the four-step approach outlined, the conclusion is
reached that (objective) security supports the enactment of the proposed
counterterrorism measure, consideration must then turn to liberty. Using the
balance metaphor, it is commonly supposed that measures which increase
security inevitably involve a decrease in liberty. This assumption finds
expression in a variety of colloquialisms-trading off liberty for security,
sacrificing liberty for increased security, or making inroads on liberty for the
sake of enhanced security. But this assumption is not shared by all. Those on
all sides of counterterrorism debates regularly claim that the measures for
which they are arguing will make us safer without diminishing our civil
liberties. Consider the following statements, all taken from debates in the
House of Representatives in October 2001 in the run-up to the USA PATRIOT
Act"6 being signed into law:
I believe it [the Bill] now responsibly addresses many of the shortcomings of the current law and improves law enforcement's ability to
prevent future terrorism activities and the preliminary crimes which
further such activities while preservingthe civil rights ofourcitizens.65
Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a supporter and original cosponsor of the
PATRIOT anti-terrorism bill. This is a powerful piece ofcrime-fighting
legislation. It gives the FBI additional tools to go after terrorists. It
creates criminal penalties for people who harbor terrorists. At the same
time, it respects the civil liberties ofour citizens.166
[It strikes] a balance that gives the resources to the agencies of this
government to protect the American people while at the same time
67
protects us from any trespass against our liberties.1
164. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 112.
165. 147 CONG. REc. H6705, H6759 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner,
Jr.) (emphasis added).
166. 147 CONG. REC. at H6762 (statement of Rep. Keller) (emphasis added).
167. 147 CONG. REC. at H6768 (statement of Rep. Armey) (emphasis added).
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To similar effect is former Attorney-General John Ashcroft's insistence
that "[t]he lives and liberties of Americans are protected by the Patriot Act....
I would not and I will not support or invite any change that might restrict or
endanger the individual liberties and personal freedoms of Americans.' ' 8 The
same is also true of critics of the USA PATRIOT Act, as article titles such as
'We Can Be Both Safe and Free' 169 illustrate. Indeed, in their report Long Term
Legal Strategy Projectfor PreservingSecurity and Democratic Freedoms in
the War on Terrorism,Philip Heymann and Juliette Kayyem state "[w]e believe
that the competing concerns of national security and democratic freedom can
largely be reconciled by the intelligent use of legislative and judicial processes
to both support and constrain executive branch authority."' 70 In short, the
assumption that increases in security necessarily involve some sacrifice of
liberty is out of sync with what those who debate counterterrorism policy
perceive themselves to be doing.
Of course, with many of these statements there is an element of not ceding
the rhetorical ground. The aim of this section of the essay, however, is to show
that this disparity is as much attributable to the fact that the balance metaphor
fails to account for different people holding different views of what the dictates
of liberty are and how these dictates would best be satisfied. Take an example
involving an investigative power (X) which, it has been determined, will increase
(objective) security, and a procedural safeguard (Y), which some claim it is
necessary to impose. The discussion of what liberty requires in this situation can
be divided into three stages. First, opinions might differ on whether power X is
one which should ever be vested in the state. While one person might feel that it
would be morally indefensible to ever introduce the use of the power, another
might regard it as a regrettable but necessary evil. Second, opinions may differ
on the effect of power X on liberty. One person might regard it as a grave
incursion, while another might feel that it involves at most minimal intrusion.
Third, opinions may differ on whether safeguard Y is needed to regulate how
power X is used and keep its exercise within the permitted bounds. In one
person's eyes it might be an essential restriction, while in another's it could be an
unnecessary and counterproductive impediment which hinders the work of
investigators. The balance metaphor would reduce discussion of power X and
safeguard Y to simplistic statements about how much weight one attaches to the
values of security and liberty. Yet someone who believes that the level of

168. John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft Protecting Life and
Liberty (Sept. 18, 2003).
169. See generally Edgar & Walczak, supra note 119.
170. PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETTE N. KAYYEM, NAT'L MEM'L INST. FOR THE PREVENTION OF
TERRORISM, LONG-TERM LEGAL STRATEGY PROJECT FOR PRESERVING SECURITY AND DEMOCRATIC
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 2 (2004).
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intrusiveness of power X is de minimis would not, in their eyes, be
sacrificing/attaching less weight to civil liberties. Neither would the person
who believes that safeguard Y is not needed to keep the exercise of power X
within its permitted bounds, since they do not believe that the absence of
safeguard Y will result in power X being abused. Conversely, someone who
believes that safeguard Y is necessary to prevent power X being abused, and
that its imposition does not entail any other costs,'7 1 would not in their eyes be
sacrificing/attaching less weight to security, since the intended effect of
safeguard Y is merely to keep the exercise of power X within the permitted
bounds. The balance metaphor thus hinders engagement with the wide variety
of perspectives held by those who discuss counterterrorism policy. Instead of
opening up discussion of these diverse issues, it shoehorns them into an
analytical straitjacket.
This section of the essay works through each of the three stages just
outlined. For each stage, the inadequacy of the balance metaphor will be
illustrated using an example. First, the debate surrounding the use of torture in
emergency situations of grave danger will be used to illustrate how different
views on the dictates of liberty can result in different opinions on whether
vesting particular powers in the state can ever be justified. Second, the
controversy surrounding section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act will be used to
demonstrate that there can be widely divergent views on the actual effect of a
power on liberty. Section 215 will also be used to show, thirdly, how different
perspectives on a proposed regulatory safeguard can stem from different views
of what is needed to satisfy the liberal concern to prevent abuses of state power.
At each stage, the essay will sketch the contours of a theoretical framework for
analyzing counterterrorism policy which is capable of accommodating
consideration of this variety of different perspectives.
A. Does Liberty Require an Absolute Prohibition?
The first issue to consider is whether the dictates of liberty demand that
the power in question never be vested in the state. A helpful example of how
views may differ on this issue is the use of torture. It is commonly said that
liberty requires an absolute prohibition on the use of torture.' 72 This is the
position that has been adopted by different international treaties. This United
Nations Convention Against Torture forbids the use of torture in all
171. See infra Part ml.C.
172. David Cole, for example, has described such a prohibition as "integral to civilized society."
Cole, supra note 27, at 1741. See also Cole's comments on Alan Dershowitz's proposed torture warrants,
saying that "[t]he fundamental constitutional problem with torture is one of substantive due process, not
procedural due process. Torture violates core norms of human decency and respect, and no amount of
procedural protections can justify it." Cole, supra note 45, at 1795.
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circumstances, expressly providing that "[n]o exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political
instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of
torture."' 73 The European Convention on Human Rights contains a similar
provision.174 Subject to certain reservations, the United States has ratified the
first of these treaties.' 75 The Long-Term Legal Strategy Project report on
counterterrorism strategies found no compelling reason for the United States
ever to violate its obligations under this treaty, recommending that they be
respected without exception.'7 6 However, it is possible for others to hold
different views on this issue, as David Luban has explained.177 He outlines five
possible motives for torture-to celebrate military victory, to terrorize a
population, to punish an offender, to extract a confession, and to gather
intelligence.' 78 Torture perpetrated for the first four of these motives is, he says,
173. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
art. 2, 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 (entered into force on June 26, 1987 in accordance with Article
27). The treaty was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984. G.A. Res. 39/46, 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).
174. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4,
1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (stating, unequivocally, that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.").
175. The reservations include a more restrictive definition oftorture than the one contained in Article
1 of the Convention:
[T]he United States understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that
mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from:
(1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or
suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened administration or
application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the
threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain
or suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or other
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Ratification
by the U.S. of America and Accession by Ga., art. IL 1, Oct. 21, 1994, 1830 U.N.T.S 320.
176. HEYMANN & KAYYEM, supra note 170, at 2. The report's recommendation is based on the
definition of torture contained in the U.S. reservation to Article 1 of the Convention; the report then goes on to
countenance the use of highly coercive interrogation techniques in some limited circumstances. Id.As this
illustrates, how torture is defined is critical. See generally,U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICEOF LEGAL COUNSEL,
MEMORANDUM FOR ALBERTO R. GONZALES COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
INTERROGATION UNDER 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2002) (rescinded after widespread public condemnation);
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES B. COMEY DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL, RE: LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE UNDER 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2004).
177. See David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REv. 1425, 1429
(2005).
178. Id. at 1432-36. Luban explains that he is using the word "liberalism" in the broad sense used
by political philosophers from John Stuart Mill onwards. Id. at 1426.
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denounced by the liberal as cruel and tyrannical-"it aims to strip away from
its victim all the qualities of human dignity that liberalism prizes."' 79 But once
the possibility of torture motivated by these considerations is discounted, so
that the only possible justification for torture is to gather intelligence in gravely
dangerous situations, it becomes plausible to see "torture as a civilized, not an
atavistic practice."' 80 Viewed in this way, it "might conceivably be acceptable
181
to a liberal":
Now, for the first time, it becomes possible to think of torture as a last
resort of men and women who are profoundly reluctant to torture.
And in that way, liberals can for the first time think of torture
dissociated from cruelty-torture authorized and administered by
decent human beings who abhor what circumstances force them to do.
Torture to gather intelligence and save lives seems almost heroic. For
1 82
the first time, we can think of kindly torturers rather than tyrants.
Although Luban ultimately dismisses this "liberal ideology of torture," his
account does demonstrate that individuals may hold different views on whether
liberty requires an absolute prohibition on torture. 8 3 Whilst for some the
dictates of liberty require that the state never resorts to the use of torture
whatever the circumstances, others construe liberty as regarding torture as a
grave incursion on the integrity of the individual, but one that may be
countenanced in exceptional circumstances.
Applying the balance metaphor to the debate over the use of torture in the
popular ticking-bomb scenario-in which investigators are sure that an
individual they have detained knows the location of a bomb which is set to
explode imminently and, if it does explode, will kill hundreds of people (or
more)-illustrates its inadequacy as an analytical tool. The metaphor tells us
that those who support an absolute prohibition on the use of torture attach more
weight to liberty than those who propose crafting exceptions to cater for such
extreme cases and/or that they attach less weight to security. Both of these

179. Id. at 1430.
180. Id.at 1436.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See also Michael Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REv. 280, 333 (1989)
(concluding, after advancing his complex agent-relative view of moraity-which, when applied to the use
of torture in emergency situations, holds that the moral norm 'never torture' "applies less firmly to those who
culpably cause the need for torture by planting the bomb that needs removal ... [and] those who could
remove the threatened harm at little cost to themselves ....--- that the torture of those who possess lifesaving information but refuse to divulge it (whether terrorists or not) should not flatly be banned).
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conclusions would be unjustified.' For example, although Luban concludes
that there should be an absolute prohibition on torture, it cannot be said that he
attaches less weight to security than those who favor crafting an exception for
the ticking-bomb scenario.' 8 5 Luban argues that the scenario is an oversimplistic, seductive example that is "built on a set of assumptions that amount
to intellectual fraud. .. ""' It stipulates that "the bomb is there, ticking away,
and that officials know it and know they have the man who planted
it"-conditions which in practice "will seldom be met."' 87 In other words, he
contests the claim that creating an exception to the prohibition on the use of
torture for ticking-bomb type situations would increase our security; in his eyes,
then, he is not attaching less weight to security because any purported gains in
security from creating such an exception are highly speculative, even illusory.
The assertion that those who propose creating such an exception attach
less weight to liberty than those who support an absolute prohibition is equally
unjustified. While the latter regard torture in all its forms as cruel and
tyrannical, and so argue that liberty requires an absolute prohibition, Luban's
essay demonstrates that it is possible to hold a different view of the demands
of liberty.'88 On this view, the element of tyrannical cruelty evaporates when
torture is used in emergency situations of grave danger.8 9 Absent these
elements of cruelty and tyranny, the use of torture, although still a grave evil,
can be countenanced. The balance metaphor ignores this; it assumes that there
is uniform understanding of what liberty requires, and by doing so it obscures
analysis. Consider further Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule's argument that
those forms of coercive interrogation which amount to torture should be treated
by the law in the same way as other coercive governmental practices (like the
use of deadly force by police officers and preventive detention)--by subjecting
them to a "set of [legal] regulations defined ex ante."' 90 To accuse Posner and
Vermeule of attaching too little weight to liberty relative to security would be

184. There is also a further difficulty. The balance metaphor tells us that, if the relative weight
attached to security increases, the balance between security and liberty should be redressed. Applying this
to the issue of torture, the metaphor simply assumes that exceptions to the prohibition of torture which will
have the effect of increasing security are permissible, if this is what redressing the security-liberty balance
requires. It thus implicitly rejects the absolutist stance that the state should never resort to the use of torture.
This is symptomatic of a broader failure; by placing all standards which are associated with liberty on one
side of the balance, and weighing them against security, the metaphor ignores the prior question of whether
some of these standards are so fundamental that they should be deemed non-derogable.
185. See Luban, supra note 177, at 1442.
186. Id.at 1427.
187. Id.at 1442.
188. See id.
at 1427.
189. See id.
at 1439.
190. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive InterrogationBe Legal?, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 671, 674 (2006).
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to simply assume that the dictates of liberty demand that torture be regarded as
so distinctly abhorrent that an absolute prohibition is required, and so would
ignore the underlying normative question-whether liberty does require the use
of torture to be singled out from these other coercive practices, which are, as
Posner and Vermeule point out, also grave evils.' 91
It is essential that any theoretical framework for the analysis of counterterrorism policy opens up discussion of these different perspectives. If,
following such discussion, it is decided that the demands of liberty do not
dictate that the power in question never be vested in the state, discussion of
whether the proposed counterterrorism measure should be enacted should focus
on the remaining two issues in this section of the essay-the impact of the
power on liberty and the necessity of regulatory safeguards. But even if it is
decided that liberty does demand an absolute prohibition on the power in
question, it does not follow that the power should not be enacted. The expected
gain in security must be placed alongside the departure from the demands of
liberty, and an assessment must be made of the importance of these respective
interests. If it is felt that the security gain that will be procured by enactment
of the power takes priority over the incursion on the demands of liberty then,
ceteris paribus,1 92 the power should be enacted.
B. What Will the Impact of the Power be on Liberty?
If it is decided that liberty does not require an absolute prohibition on the
power in question, the next step is to consider what impact the power in
question will actually have on liberty. This too is an issue on which opinions
may differ markedly, as the debate over section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
Whilst some have
Act' 9 3-the so-called library provision-illustrates.
condemned section 215 as a grave invasion on liberty, others have claimed that
it actually involves little or no incursion.
Section 215 replaced and expanded the business records provision in Title
V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).' 94 The FISA provision
191. Id. at 707.
192. Other considerations, such as operational efficiency and fiscal management, may also need to
be considered at this stage. For example, it has been found that one of the variables affecting the probability
that a person favors targeted screening at airports is waiting time. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J.
Zeckhauser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce Terrorism Risks, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 99, 104
(2003) (finding that, given a choice between targeted screening and a random screening process involving
delays for all passengers, support for targeting increased as the expected delays for all passengers rose; the
probability that an individual supported targeting was nineteen percent higher when the expected delay for
all passengers was 1 hour than when it was ten minutes).
193. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 112, at 287-88.
194. Intelligence Authorization Act for 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, 5 U.S.C.A. (112 Stat.) 2396,
2411 [hereinafter Intelligence Authorization Act] (amending Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-511, 50 U.S.C. (92 Stat.) 1783 [hereinafter FISA]).
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allowed the FBI to seek "an order authorizing a common carrier, public
accommodation facility, physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility to
release records in its possession . . ,,.""
Section 215 expanded this power,
first, by replacing the word "records" with the far broader "any tangible things
(including books, records, papers, documents and other items)," and, second,
by removing altogether the limitation on the businesses which could be required
to release records.'9 6 It is thus a broad power, not limited to travel
documentation as the FISA provision effectively was, nor to library records, as
its colloquial title suggests.
Section 215 generated a great deal of comment.'97 One of its most
contentious aspects was the legal threshold for the making of an order. 9 ' Under
FISA it was necessary to produce "specific and articulable facts giving reason
to believe that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or
agent of a foreign power."'" Section 215 lowered this standard, instead
requiring that an application for an order "specify that the records concerned
are sought for an authorized investigation ... to obtain foreign intelligence

information not concerning a United States person or to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities."2 ' As well as its
195. Intelligence Authorization Act, supra note 194, at 2411.
196. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 112, at 287.
197. See generally UnpatrioticActs: The FBI'SPower to Rifle Through YourRecords andPersonal
Belongings Without Telling You (ACLU Report, New York, N.Y.), July 2003 [hereinafter ACLU]; Edgar &
Walczak, supranote 119, at 26, 27; Susan N. Herman, The USA PatriotActandthe SubmajoritarianFourth
Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67 (2006); Beryl A. Howell, Surveillance Powers in the USA
PatriotAct: How Scary Are They?, 76 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 12 (2005); Anne Klinefelter, The Role ofLibrarians
in Challenges to the USA PATRIOT Act, 5 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 219 (2004); Kathryn Martin, The USA
PATRIOT Act's Application to Library Patron Records, 29 J. LEGIS. 283 (2003); Michael O'Donnell,
Readingfor Terrorism: Section 215 of the USA PatriotAct and the ConstitutionalRight to Information
Privacy,31 J. LEGIs. 45 (2004); James B. Perrine, The USA PatriotAct: Big Brotheror Business as Usual?,
19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 163 (2005); Joseph G. Poluka, The PatriotAct: Indispensable
ToolAgainst Terror,76 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 33 (2005); Raab, supra note 113; Paul Rosenzweig, CivilLiberty
and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DuQ. L. REv. 663 (2004); Woods, supra note 120.
198. Also highly contentious was the gag order provision, according to which all individuals,
including the recipient of the section 215 request, were prohibited from disclosing "to any other person (other
than those persons necessary to produce the tangible things under this section) that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has sought or obtained tangible things under this section." USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note
112, at 218. This provision meant that the target of the order would never learn of its issuance (unless and
until a criminal prosecution was brought). It also contained no exception for the recipient to consult with a
lawyer. The Reauthorization Act now provides that the recipient may consult with an attorney "to obtain
legal advice or assistance with respect to the production of things in response to the order..." and that such
advice/assistance that has been sought need not be communicated to the FBI. USA PATRIOT ACT 2005,
supra note 117, at 197. The Act also expressly provides that the recipient of the order may challenge the
legality of the order, and includes enhanced oversight provisions. Id.at 198.
199. Intelligence Authorization Act, supra note 194, at 2411.
200. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 112, at 288.
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insertion of the lower standard of relevance, this alteration was criticized for
removing the requirement that the records pertain to a foreign power or an agent
of one, since this permitted the collection of information about persons who are
not the target of an investigation. When the USA PATRIOT Act was
reauthorized in March 2006,201 an attempt was made to address these concerns
by amending the threshold for the making of an order, so that an application for
an order today must include:
[A] statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized
investigation (other than a threat assessment)... to obtain foreign
intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to
protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities, such things being presumptively relevant to an authorized
investigation if the applicant shows in the statement of the facts that
they pertain toi) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
ii) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who
is the subject of such authorized investigation; or
iii) an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected
agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such
authorized investigation .... 2o2
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) decried section 215 as
"misguided, dangerous, and unconstitutional. 2 3 It claimed that, by "allowing
the government to search and seize your personal records or belongings without
a warrant and without showing probable cause," the provision violated the
Fourth Amendment. 2°4 However, it is hard to reconcile this claim with Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Although in Katz v. United States the Supreme
Court declared that the Fourth Amendment protects "reasonable expectations
of privacy,, 20 5 in the subsequent case UnitedStates v. Millerthe Court held that
a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties. 206 A seven Justice majority accordingly held that
Miller-whose financial records had been obtained from his bank by the
government-had no legitimate expectation of privacy because he had
voluntarily conveyed the information in question to the bank and thereby

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

USA PATRIOT ACT 2005, supranote 117.
Id.at 196.
ACLU, supra note 197, at 1.
Id. at 7.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
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exposed it to the bank employees.2" 7 This approach was later applied to
telephone records; in Smith v. Marylandthe Court held the Fourth Amendment
does not apply where the government obtains records from a telephone
company of the numbers an individual has received calls from and/or the
numbers an individual has called. 208 There was no legitimate expectation of
privacy because the information had voluntarily been disclosed to the telephone
company, and Smith had thereby assumed the risk that the company would
reveal that information to the government.20 9 Although it may be possible to
construct arguments supporting a limited reading of Miller and Smith in respect
of at least some of the records covered by section 215-some commentators,
for example, have argued that Miller and Smith should not apply in the context
of the Internet2-on a straightforward application of these cases it is difficult
to sustain the claim that the section engages the Fourth Amendment. For this
reason Susan Herman has recently called on the Supreme Court to renovate its
"submajoritarian" approach to defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment,
sketching three steps by which it might craft for itself "some meaningful role
in evaluating the reasonableness of government surveillance. 2 11
The fact that section 215 does not seem to implicate the Fourth
Amendment does not settle the question of whether it can be described as
liberty-diminishing. In Hohfeldian terms the Constitution and its Amendments
are a list of immunities, not privileges (liberties).2 12 As Andrew Halpin has

207.

Id. at 442.

208.

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).

209.

Id. at 744.
See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, SurveillanceLaw Through Cyberlaw 's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L.

210.

REV. 1375, 1412 (2004) (arguing that to conclude, on the basis of Miller and Smith, that a subscriber lacks
an expectation of privacy in communications an Internet service provider stores on his/her behalf would be
"fundamentally inconsistent with Miller'sdoctrinal underpinnings, with Katz, and with case law in analogous
areas."); Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical
Perspective on the Electronic Communications PrivacyAct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1557, 1559 (2004)
(outlining three principles which, she claims, should limit the reach of the business records cases, and
proposes revising ECPA "to establish appropriate privacy protections that respect individuals' expectations
and constitutional requirements."). See also O'Donnell, supra note 197, at 67 (proposing an alternative
approach to challenging section 215, and arguing that there is a Constitutional right to information privacy,
and that this "provides a plausible basis for litigants to challenge this harmful provision.").
211. Herman, supra note 197, at 121. On the scope ofthe Fourth Amendment, see generally Daniel
J. Solove, DigitalDossiers and the Dissipation of FourthAmendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083
(2002); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: ConstitutionalMyths and the Case
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801 (2004); Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why PropertyDoes
Not Define The Limits of the Right Against UnreasonableSearches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REV. 889
(2004); Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REv. 904 (2004); Orin S. Kerr,
Technology, Privacy, and the Courts: A Reply to Colb and Swire, 102 MICH. L. REV. 933 (2004).
212. See WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING 3 8-50, 60-64 (Walter W. Cook ed., Yale Univ. Press 1964).
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explained, Hohfeld in fact defined the concept privilege in two distinct
ways-as the equivalent of a no-duty (where X is under no obligation to Y to
act or omit to act in a certain way), and as the protection afforded by the law to
permit X to do, or refrain from doing, some act.21 3 Access to, and use of, public
libraries is a privilege (liberty) in the second of these two senses. As Halpin
explains, a privilege in this sense is not, contrary to Hohfeld's claim, a
fundamental legal conception, since it is reducible to a set of rights with
correlative duties. 2 4 As far as the privilege (liberty) to access and use public
libraries is concerned, one of these rights-duties concerns privacy. Although
the effect of Millerand Smith seems to be that access to library records does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment-something which a Justice Department
apologia of section 215 has stressed 2 15-almost all states have passed
legislation which protects the privacy of patrons' library records.2" 6 But
opinions differed markedly on the extent of the effect that section 215 had on
this right to privacy. Some, like the ACLU, denounced the provision as a grave
invasion of civil liberties. 2 7 For them, it posed a serious threat to First
Amendment activities, allowing investigators to intrude into the world of ideas
by discovering what people have been reading. 2 They also warned that the
section would have a severe chilling effect. 219 These concerns were
exacerbated still further by the removal of the requirement that the records
being sought pertain to a foreign power or an agent of one-a development
which critics described as a license to go on fishing expeditions through the
records of individuals who are not even the target of an investigation. 22' But
these concerns were not shared by all. Others believed that the threat to First
Amendment activities had been overblown, pointing out that section 215
expressly forbids investigations of a United States person which are solely
based upon "activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of
the United States., 221 They also stressed that section 215 had only a minimal
213.
214.

ANDREW HALPIN, RIGHTS AND LAW- ANALYSIS AND THEORY 41 (1997).
Id. Halpin also explains that the first sense of privilege is not a fundamental concept, since it

is simply the negation of a duty. Id. In fact, he argues, six of Hohfeld's conceptions are reducible in terms
of the other two (rights and duties). Id. at 47.
215. Letter from Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, United
States Senate (Dec. 23, 2002), available athttp'//fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj-fisa-patriot- 122302b.pdf(last
visited Aug. 3, 2008).
216.
217.

Martin, supra note 197, at 289 n.37.
ACLU, supra note 197, at 2. See also Edgar & Walczak, supra note 119, at 27; Klinefelter,

supra note 197, at 220; Martin, supranote 197, at 291.
218.

ACLU, supra note 197, at 2.

219.

Martin, supra note 197, at 291.

220.

Id.at 300.

221.

Perrine, supranote 197, at 190 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (a)(l ) (2001)). USA PATRIOT ACT,

supra note 112, at 287.
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marginal effect on the privacy of library patrons' records, explaining that most
of the state statutes protecting patrons' privacy already contained exceptions
covering court orders, that investigators and prosecutors had long been able to
use grand jury subpoenas to compel libraries to produce patrons' records in
criminal investigations,2 22 and that since 9/11 the FBI had received information
from libraries on a voluntary basis. 223 They thus claimed that critics of the
section were guilty of what Posner and Vermeule have described as a sort of
baseline error: "Civil libertarians ascribe to the PATRIOT Act 'deprivations'
of civil liberties as measured from some baseline set of entitlements that either
in the relevant respects long before the
never existed, or that was changed
' 224
PATRIOT Act was passed."
Although the previous paragraph focused on library records, since it is this
aspect of section 215 which has generated the greatest comment, the basic point
is of general application. While some claimed that section 215 was unjustifiably intrusive and so amounted to a sacrifice of liberty, others felt that the
provision actually had little or no effect on liberty. The balance metaphor is
insensitive to these different perspectives; it tells us that those who opposed
section 215 attached more weight to liberty (and/or less weight to security) than
proponents of the section. But in their own eyes the section's proponents were
not attaching less weight to liberty than its opponents because they did not
consider themselves to be advocating a sacrifice of liberty. The balance
metaphor obscures this, unjustifiably equating a belief that any reduction in
liberty will be minimal with a willingness to attach less weight to liberty.
Any theoretical framework for the analysis of counterterrorism policy
needs to open up discussion of these different perspectives. Following such
discussion, if it is decided that: (a) applying the four-step approach to security
outlined earlier in the essay, the power in question will lead to a net gain in
security; and (b) that the impact of the power in question on liberty will be no
more than de minimis, then, ceterisparibus,the power should be enacted. The
issue of whether safeguards are needed to regulate how the power is exercised
will then need to be considered (see Part IlI.C.). If, on the other hand, it is
decided that the power does involve an incursion on liberty, it does not follow
that the power should not be enacted. The anticipated gain in security will need
to placed alongside the diminution in liberty, and an assessment made of the
222. See Perrine,supra note 197, at 187; Poluka, supra note 197, at 38.
223. Letter from Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Sen. Russel D. Feingold, Chairman,
United States Senate (Dec. 23, 2002), available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj-fisa-patriot122302c.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2007). See also LibrariansDivided over PatriotAct Compliance, AM.
LIBR., Jan. 27, 2003, http://www.ala.org/al_onlineTemplate.cfn? Section=January2003&Template=/
ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=12188 (last visited Aug. 3, 2007).
224.

ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY AND

THE COURTS 79 (2007).
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importance of these interests. In making this assessment, it should be
remembered that where a power will affect a particular sub-group
disproportionately, an individual outwith that sub-group will be less likely to
place the costs of that provision on-screen. In such circumstances, it would be
easy simply to indulge fear.225 Every effort must be made to avoid this. If,
heeding this warning, it is decided that the gain in security takes priority over
the diminution in liberty, the power should, ceterisparibus,be enacted.
C. Should Safeguards be Enacted to Regulate the Use of the Power?
Although protecting individuals from abuses of state power is generally
understood to be one of the dictates of liberty, opinions can vary markedly on
what is needed to prevent a specified power from being abused. The starting
point for discussion of whether particular safeguards should be enacted must
therefore be whether they are necessary to regulate how the power in question
is used. Examination of the debates over section 215 demonstrate that this
question can be as (if not more) controversial than determining the impact a
power will have on liberty.
Although some supported the use of the relevance standard of proof in
section 215, critics urged that a more stringent legal threshold should be
deployed. Some called for the restoration of the "specific and articulable facts
giving reason to believe" standard that had been contained in Title V of
FISA,226 and the ACLU even insisted that the Fourth Amendment standard of
probable cause should apply.22 7 As explained above, the Reauthorization Act
made some effort to address these concerns. Also of concern to the critics was
subsection (c)(1) of section 215, which provided that: "Upon an application
made pursuant to this section, the judge shall enter an ex parte order as
requested, or as modified, approving the release of records 228
if the judge finds
that the application meets the requirements of this section.
The Reauthorization Act sought to clarify this provision, by making it
plain that the judge hearing the application must find that the preconditions for
the making of an order have been met. 229 Before this clarification, critics had
worried that the effect of subsection (c)(1) was to eviscerate the proceedings
before the FISA Court of any meaningful judicial oversight; they construed the
combined effect of this subsection and subsection (b)(2) to be that the judge
hearing the application would have to grant an order as long as the FBI
225. SLrNSTEIN, supra note 73, at 208.
226. See, for example, the proposals that were contained in the SAFE Act (usefully summarized in
Edgar & Walczak, supranote 119, at 31).
227. ACLU, supra note 197, at 17.
228. USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 112, at 288.
229. USA PATRIOT ACT 2005, supra note 117, at 196.
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specified that the requirements of the section were met.23 ° For critics, this
limited degree of judicial oversight, coupled with the relevance standard of
proof, meant there was a real possibility that the section 215 power could be
misused.23 1 Others, by contrast, dismissed the critics' concerns as ill-founded.
Underlying these different points of view were different perspectives on three
important issues: what constitutes an improper use of state power; how likely
it is that state power will be abused; and what is needed to prevent abuses from
occurring.
First, what constitutes an improper use of state power? The review of the
FBI's use of section 215 orders conducted by the Justice Department's OIG
found two instances of "improper use. ' 232 In the first instance, the field office
had obtained an order for a pen register/trap and trace device on a telephone
that was no longer used by the subject, which resulted in the FBI receiving
unauthorized information between March 2005 and October 2005.233 The FBI
explained that the case agent had inadvertently overlooked documents in the file
indicating that the telephone number no longer belonged to the target of the
investigation. 234 A new case agent discovered the problem, reported the over
collection, and sequestered and destroyed the improperly collected data. 235 In
the second instance, the FBI inadvertently collected certain telephone numbers
pursuant to a pen register/trap and trace order because the telephone company
had not advised the FBI that the target had discontinued using the telephone
line until several weeks after the fact. 236 During this time the telephone number
had, for a short period, been issued to someone else. 237 The FBI identified the
improperly collected information, removed it from its databases, and provided
it to the Department's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR).23 s In
his response to the report, former Attorney-General Alberto Gonzales
challenged the description of these incidents as "improper uses" of the section
215 authority-stressing that in both cases the errors were inadvertent, had
been identified and reported to the Intelligence Oversight Board and to the
Court and that the data collected had been sequestered or destroyed-and
'
concluded that the OIG's "characterization is not apt."239
So while for the OIG
230.

ACLU, supra note 197, at 5.

231.

Id. at 13.

232.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU

OF INVESTIGATION'S USE OF SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS 39 (2007) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE].

233. Id. at 41-42.
234. Id. at 42.
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236. Id. at 43.
237. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 232, at 43.
238. Id. at 44.
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the over collection of data constituted an improper use of state power, for the
Attorney-General the inadvertent nature of the over collection, coupled with its
subsequent detection and rectification, purged the mistake of any impropriety.
Second, the likelihood of state power being abused. Critics have stressed
the possibility that the FBI could abuse the power vested in it by section 215.
After detailing instances of previous abuses of other powers, the ACLU has
posed the question "can we really afford to let this agency police itself?"24
while Timothy Edgar and Witold Walczak have stated that "[f]aw enforcement
agents make mistakes ... and, as we know from history, can misuse their
powers., 241 The insinuation that the FBI cannot be trusted to exercise its
investigative powers responsibly was strongly rejected by former AttorneyGeneral John Ashcroft:
If you were to pay too much attention to some in Washington you
might conjure up harrowing images of agents working around the
clock. Like in the X-Files, they are raincoated, dark suited, and
sporting sunglasses. But unlike the X-Files, their subjects aren't
treacherous space aliens but readers and librarians. And no one
escapes their grinding interrogation. In a dull Joe Friday monotone,
they ask: 'Why were you at the library? What were you reading?
Did you see anything suspicious? Just the facts, ma'am. Just the
facts.' This image is fanciful, but the hysteria behind it is very real.
The fact is, with just 11,000 FBI agents and over a billion visitors to
America's libraries each year, the Department of Justice has neither
the staffing, the time nor the inclination to monitor the reading habits
of Americans. No offense to the American Library Association, but
we just don't care.242
Michael O'Donnell described Ashcroft's approach as "bel[ying] an
American ethos of healthy skepticism of governmental interference in citizens'
liberty-one that Mr. Ashcroft's Justice Department has provided ample
grounds for maintaining., 243 By contrast, Michael McCarthy has suggested that
the powers conferred by the USA PATRIOT Act could have been the result of
a "measured conclusion that.., changed assumptions about the nature of the
threat to domestic security... [meant that] prior political conceptions about
executive authority were no longer apt.",244 As these statements illustrate, the
contrasting views on the likelihood of the power conferred by section 215 being

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

ACLU, supra note 197, at 9, 11.
Edgar & Walczak, supranote 119, at 22.
Ashcroft, supra note 168.
O'Donnell, supra note 197, at 67.
Michael T. McCarthy, USA PATRIOTAct, 39 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 451 (2002).
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abused were influenced by different perspectives of executive power. While
Ashcroft's comments evidence a benevolent view of the FBI, critics adopted a
distrustful stance, urging the possibility of abuse.
Third, what is needed to prevent abuses from occurring? While critics
called for a more stringent legal threshold and enhanced judicial oversight,
others pointed to extra-legal constraints on the exercise of the section 215
power. Paul Rosenzweig, for example, not only asserted that the critics
overlooked the "second order effects of judicial review"-in particular the
deterrent effect of the obligation to swear an oath of truthfulness, with the
attendant perjury penalties for falsity24 5-but also claimed that their concerns
"presuppose[d] the absence of any internal, administrative mechanisms in order
to check potential misuse of the subpoena authority."246 The influence of these
bureaucratic constraints was also emphasized by Michael Woods, who stated
that "FBI counter-intelligence actually functions within a highly regulated
247
'
environment, and the language of §215 explicitly invokes such oversight.
In a similar vein, Amitai Etzioni has argued that accountability mechanisms
should play a primary role in the regulation of new technologies.248
Through an understanding of the different opinions on these three issues,
and an appreciation of the interplay between them, one is able to see that the
different views on the appropriate level of the legal threshold and degree of
judicial oversight were influenced by different perspectives on how best to
satisfy the liberal concern to prevent abuses of state power. Critics considered
the safeguards in section 215 to be inadequate.24 9 Adopting a distrustful
attitude towards executive power, they asserted that there was a grave danger
that FBI agents would abuse the widely-drafted power and that the FBI's
internal processes for preventing any such abuses would prove ineffectual, and
accordingly insisted that greater legal constraints on the section 215 power were
necessary.
Such constraints would also safeguard against the inadvertent
over collection of data, something which they insisted should never occur and
which after-the-fact efforts to rectify cannot compensate for. In stark contrast
to the critics, someone who believes that the FBI will exercise its powers
responsibly will regard the danger of individual agents intentionally abusing
their authority as slight. Plus, if they have confidence in the FBI's internal
processes, they will expect instances of intentional abuse to be weeded out
before an application for a section 215 order is approved. The same applies to
245. Rosenzweig, supra note 197, at 694.
246. Id.
247. Woods, supra note 120, at 66.
248. Amitai Etzioni, Implications of Select New Technologies for Individual Rights and Public
Safety, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 257, 290 (2002).
249. See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 197, at 1.
250.

See, e.g., id. at 2.
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inadvertent mistakes. Whilst even the most ardent supporter of the FBI would
concede that inadvertent mistakes do sometimes happen, they would expect any
such mistakes to be swiftly identified. And even if it was discovered that data
had been inadvertently collected without lawful authority, this can be rectified
by acknowledging the mistake and dealing with the mistakenly collected data
accordingly. On this view, a heightened legal threshold and enhanced judicial
oversight are unnecessary.
Any framework for discussion of counterterrorism policy must engage
with these different perspectives. Taking as their starting point the view that
executive power should be seen with suspicion, some jurists have expounded
what Kenneth Culp Davis labeled the "extravagant version of the rule of
law." '' The foundation of this version of the rule of law is the belief that
government, in all its actions, should be bound by rules fixed and announced
beforehand-a sentiment well captured by the slogan "wherever law ends,
'
Given the stark reality that no legal system can operate
tyranny begins."252
without significant discretionary power,253 proponents of the extravagant
version of the rule of law seek to eliminate as much discretion as possible from
the legal sphere.254 Beyond this they urge the need to "bring such discretion as
is reluctantly determined to be necessary within the 'legal umbrella' by
regulating it by means of general rules and standards and by subjecting its
exercise to legal scrutiny ....",255 However, this approach proceeds on the
mistaken assumption that there is a neat dichotomy between rules and
discretion. As Keith Hawkins has explained, "[d]iscretion is heavily implicated
in the use of rules,"2'56 and "rules enter the use of discretion: much of what is
often thought to be the free and flexible application of discretion by legal actors
is in fact guided and constrained by rules to a considerable extent. These rules,
however, tend not to be legal, but social and organizational in character."2 7
The extravagant version of the rule of law also overlooks the fact that the
exercise of discretion may be beneficial. It allows complex issues to be
addressed on a case-by-case basis, and avoids undue rigidity. Moreover, the
various dangers associated with discretionary decision-making can only be
expressed in general terms, and so, as Nicola Lacey warns, their application in
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257. Id.at 13.

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 15:1

' Rather,
a particular context should not be accepted as "unproblematic truth."258
one must engage in the "social science project of detailed examination of
discretion in particular contexts informed by an appreciation of the agents' own
' in order
understandings and the experiences of clients and other participants"259
to determine whether or not any of these concerns apply in a particular context.
The balance metaphor repeats many of the mistakes of the extravagant version
of the rule of law. To say, regardless of context, that the tighter the legal
threshold one supports, the more weight one attaches to the value of liberty, is
to assume that there is always a danger of abuse and that legal rules are always
necessary to guard against that danger.26 Yet, as has been explained, in a
discussion of whether a particular safeguard should be enacted it is quite
possible that those opposing the safeguard do so because they regard it as
unnecessary. This might be because they believe that the dangers warned of by
the safeguard's proponents are in fact slight-perhaps the result of a
"libertarian panic" 26 -- or that they believe that there are already sufficient
extra-legal constraints in place to regulate how the power is exercised. Issues
such as these need careful scrutiny. Instead of acting as a catalyst for
examination of these issues, the balance metaphor obscures them.
If it is concluded that a specified safeguard is not necessary to regulate
how a power is used, it follows that-in the absence of other reasons to
implement it 26 2-the safeguard should not be introduced. And even if it is
agreed that a particular safeguard would provide meaningful regulation, this
does not necessarily mean that it should be implemented. First, an assessment
would have to be made ofthe repercussions introduction of the safeguard would
have on security, using the four-step approach outlined in Part II above. For
whilst (as argued in Part II.C. 1) stricter procedural safeguards may sometimes

258. Lacey, supranote 255, at 371.
259. Id.
260. The metaphor also obscures analysis by depicting government as acting on our behalf in striking
the right balance, thereby suggesting a benevolent view of the state. More generally, studies have found that
public trust in government increased in the aftermath of 9/1 1. Virginia A. Chanley, Trust in Government in
the Aftermath of 9/11: Determinants and Consequences, 23 POL. PSYCHOL. 469, 469 (2002). And in the
immediate aftermath of the attacks, the media tended to unquestioningly support the government's response
to them. Lisa Finnegan Abdolian & Harold Takooshian, The USA PA TRIOTAct: CivilLiberties,the Media,
and Public Opinion, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1429, 1436-37 (2003).
261. Adrian Vermeule, LibertarianPanics, 36 RUrrGERS L.J. 871, 871 (2005). Vermeule explains
that the heuristics which can cause security panics are also capable of producing libertarian panics---"Panic
can produce a widespread and unjustified suspicion of governmental responses to genuine security risks."
Id. at 875.
262. For example, if exercising the power in question involves a significant invasion of liberty, then
tighter preconditions for the exercise of the power could be supported if the effect of the preconditions would
be to reduce use of the power. As explained in supra Part II.C. 1, it is also possible that the introduction of
a safeguard could increase security.
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have the potential to increase security, in other situations they might result in
reductions in security, perhaps by reducing the expediency with which the
power in question can be exercised, or by having a chilling effect on
investigators' willingness to employ the power in question. 263 They might also
reduce security by making it difficult, perhaps nigh impossible, for an
investigator to resort to using the power unlawfully in situations where s/he
feels there is an urgent need to do So. 2" Bruce Ackerman has been criticized
for failing to recognize this point in Before the Next Attack; Adrian Vermeule
has accused him of being "obsessed with minimizing executive abuses to zero,
no matter what the collateral costs," adding that "executive abuses should be
optimized, not minimized; they are an inevitable by-product of the optimal
security regime and should be weighed against the offsetting benefits, such as
saving people's lives., 265 Legal journalist Stuart Taylor Jr.'s statement that "I
would take some FBI abuse to stop a few bombings that kill hundreds of people,
let alone thousands of people" 2 expresses a similar sentiment.
As well as considering the security repercussions, thought should also be
given to whether there are liberty-based objections to introducing the proposed
safeguard. Whilst enhanced safeguards might help regulate the use of the
power, the incidental effect could be to legitimize, and encourage greater use
of, a power that involves a grave invasion of liberty.267 A useful example is
Alan Dershowitz's suggestion that judicial torture warrants be introduced, the
granting of which would allow the use of non-lethal torture in ticking-bomb

263. See, for example, Amitai Etzioni's assertion:
Deficient accountability opens the door to government abuses of power, and
excessively tight controls make agents reluctant to act. Thus, a case can be made that
under most of Hoover's reign, the FBI was insufficiently accountable. One could also
argue that under the new rules adopted following the Church Commission report, the
FBI was excessively limited in its ability to conduct communications surveillance.
Agents, fearing reprimands and damage to their careers, may have been too reluctant
to act.
Etzioni, supra note 248, at 281.
264. To borrow the title of Michael Ignatieff's book, it could be argued that the unlawful use of a
power in such situations would be "the lesser evil." See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL
ETHICS INAN AGE OF TERROR (2004). The malleability of this phrase has led some to argue that Ignatieff's
book offers an intellectual apologia for the practices of the Bush administration. For a rebuttal of this claim,
see Martha Minow, What is the GreatestEvil?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2134 (2005).
265. Vermeule, supra note 60, at 643.
266. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Panel Discussion, The USA PATRIOT Act and the American Response to
Terror: Can We Protect Civil Liberties after September 11?, 39 Am. CRIm. L. REV. 1501, 1510 (2002).
267. It has been pointed out that "enjoying the benefits of due process does not rule out ending up
in Hell." ANDREw RUTHERFORD, PRISONS AND THE PROCESS OF JUSTICE 25 (1984) (referring to an
observation from legal scholar Alexander Bickel).
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type scenarios.268 Dershowitz argues that, since "a formal, visible, accountable
and centralized system is somewhat easier to control than an ad hoc, off-thebooks, and under-the-radar screen nonsystem" the "formal requirement of a
judicial warrant as a prerequisite to nonlethal torture would decrease the
amount of physical violence directed against suspects."2'69 This claim has been
doubted by Oren Gross: "Realizing that courts are likely to assume a highly
deferential attitude when asked to issue torture warrants, and seeking to have
such warrants as a shield against potential claims and charges, officials will
have positive incentives to take an increasing number of cases to the courts."27
Gross asserts that Dershowitz failed to consider an alternative possibility
-to maintain an absolute legal prohibition on torture whilst recognizing that
there may be "extreme" or "catastrophic" cases where public officials may act
extralegally. 27' In such cases, he argues, the public should decide ex post facto
whether to ratify the official's actions.27 2 Since in such a system "officials must
put themselves in the line of fire and act at their own peril," torture will be
resorted to less often than in a system of ex ante judicial warrants which "shifts
the burden and risk to the courts." 27 What this exchange illustrates is that it is
possible to opine that, on balance, the dictates of liberty militate against
safeguards which it has been agreed will regulate how a power is used. While
Gross agrees that the procedure for obtaining a judicial torture warrant would
regulate how the power to torture is used-in the sense that he considers it
unlikely that in a system of ex ante judicial torture warrants officials would
torture a suspect without first obtaining a warrant 74 -in his view the dictates
of liberty require that a judicial torture warrant not be introduced, for such a
system would cause torture to be resorted to more frequently.2 75
So if it is agreed that a particular safeguard will regulate how the power
in question is used, consideration should then turn to whether the safeguard has
costs in terms of security and/or liberty. If so, it must then be asked whether the

268.

See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS:

UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT,

RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 158 (2002).

269. Id.
270. Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official
Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1541-42 (2004).
271. Id.at 1535.
272. Id.at 1535-36. Gross' proposal is similar to the one advanced by Henry Shue. See Henry
Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 125 (1978) (arguing that, whilst the legal prohibition on torture
should not be relaxed, it should be open to investigators to violate this prohibition in exceptional cases.
Afterwards, the torturer should then be required to "convince a group of peers in a public trial that all
necessary conditions for a morally permissible act were indeed satisfied)." Id.at 143.
273. Gross, supra note 270, at 1549.
274. Id. at 1538-40.
275. Id. at 1541-42.
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liberal concern to prevent abuses of state power should take priority over these
other costs.
IV. CONCLUSION

The balance metaphor's image of a set of scales fails to capture the
complexity of the task of analysing counterterrorism policy. One of the
principal reasons for this is that it assumes a shared understanding of what each
pan of the metaphorical scales represents, and so fails to engage with the variety
of perspectives individuals hold on what the demands of security and liberty
actually are, and on how these demands would best be met. A new framework,
which opens up discussion of these different perspectives, is thus needed. The
appendix to this essay sets out such a framework. Couched in the form of a
flow diagram, the framework begins by setting out as a necessary precondition
for the enactment of any proposed counterterrorism measure the requirement
that it will prevent or impede terrorist activity. This reflects this essay's
argument that new counterterrorism laws should not be enacted on the basis that
they will increase subjective security. The next box incorporates the four-step
approach to objective security outlined in Part II.C. The demands of objective
security only support the enactment of a measure if the effect it has in
preventing/impeding terrorist activity is greater than the sum of: any incidental
effects the measure will have which will diminish security; any opportunity
costs in terms of other measures to combat the terrorist threat; and any
opportunity costs in terms of efforts to combat other threats to our security. If
this is the case attention then turns to liberty. The first question-whether
liberty demands an absolute prohibition on the power in question-opens up
discussion of situations like the use of torture in emergency situations of grave
danger. Part III.A showed that, whilst some feel that liberty requires an
absolute prohibition on the use of torture, it is possible to construe the demands
of liberty differently, so that in exceptional circumstances it is regarded as a
grave incursion on liberty, but one which may be countenanced. If liberty is
construed as not requiring an absolute prohibition on the power in question, it
must then be asked what the power's actual impact on liberty will be. This too
is an issue on which opinions may diverge markedly, as the discussion of
section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act demonstrated. If it is concluded that
liberty does require an absolute prohibition on the power in question, or that the
power will have a significant impact on liberty, it must be asked whether the
security gain that will be procured takes priority over the incursion on liberty.
If not, the power should not be enacted. If so-or if it is decided that the power
will have no more than a de minimis impact on liberty--consideration then
turns to the issue of safeguards. Here the first question is whether it is possible
to devise safeguards to regulate how the power is used. For many
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counterterrorism powers, such as those in the realm of intelligence, it may
simply not be possible to adopt legal regulatory safeguards. Where this is the
case, it must be asked whether the lack of safeguards will result in the power
being abused. If not, the power should be enacted. If so, it may be that the
potential for the power to be abused means that it should be abandoned
altogether. Where it is possible to devise regulatory safeguards, the next
question is whether the power will be abused without these safeguards. As the
discussion of section 215 in Part III.C illustrated, this can be a contentious issue
which is obscured by simple questions about how much weight a person
attaches to liberty (relative to security). Even if it is decided that the power will
not be abused without the safeguards, it may be that there are other reasons for
enacting them. For example, the discussion of NSLs in Part II.C. 1 showed that
tightening the legal threshold for the exercise of an investigative power may
have security benefits. Where there are reasons for enacting the safeguards, it
must then be asked whether the safeguards have any security related costs (such
as reducing the expediency with which the power in question can be exercised
or exerting a chilling effect on investigators' willingness to employ the power)
and/or any liberty related costs (e.g., the discussion ofjudicial torture warrants
in Part III.C showed that, where the enactment of safeguards will result in more
frequent recourse to a power, the dictates of liberty may militate against their
enactment). If so, it must be asked whether the reasons for enacting the
safeguards take priority over the costs. If they do (or if the safeguards do not
have any costs) the power should be enacted with the safeguards in question.
If not, it may be that the lack of appropriate safeguards means that the power
should be abandoned altogether. Here the risk of the power being abused must
be placed alongside the preventive/impedimentary effect the power will have
on terrorist activity, and an assessment made of the relative importance of these
concerns.
Whilst primarily aimed at the legislative task of drafting new counterterrorism laws, the proposed framework could also be applied at other levels,
e.g., executive decision-making. It could, for example, be used to explicate
Gross' suggestion that in extreme situations officials should resort to the use of
torture-the framework could be applied to the legislative decision whether to
condone the use of torture, and then applied again to the extralegal decisions of
individual officials to resort to torture. It should also be pointed out that the
framework is designed to be used in those areas of counterterrorism policy
which raise issues relating to liberty, and so is not intended to be used in those
areas-such as port security2 76 -which have little or no bearing on liberty.
Moreover, even where liberty is in issue, other considerations such as
276.

See DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEvE SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK: THE GLOBALIZATION OF JIHAD

249-50 (2005).
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operational efficiency and fiscal management can also influence counterterrorism policy, 277 and so may need to be factored in at appropriate stages of
the flow diagram.
Political opponents commonly seek to outflank one another by proposing
the sternest, most biting, counterterrorism initiatives. Ironically, in this climate
protests from civil liberties organisations can be perceived as desirable, for they
serve to underline the strong-handedness of the proposed measures. The
presentation of security and liberty as binary opposites epitomized by the image
of a set of scales thus has a certain political appeal. Nonetheless, the balance
metaphor is inadequate as an analytical framework. A new approach is needed.
The framework advanced in this essay should be adopted.

277.

See supratext accompanying note 192.
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V. APPENDIX: THE ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF
COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY
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